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INTRODUCTION 
Designer Carter Bryant was under a contract with Mattel, Inc., 
manufacturer and owner of the Barbie doll, when he produced 
some drawings and came up with the characteristics of what 
became the Bratz doll.1  Bryant then moved to MGA 
Entertainment, Inc., producer of Bratz, which, since her market 
debut in 2001,2 posed serious competition to the Barbie doll.3  
Lawsuits followed.  In 2008, a federal jury in California found in 
favor of Mattel and ordered a total of $100 million for several 
 
 1 Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also Jury 
Rules for Mattel in Bratz Doll Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at C5; David Colker, 
Mattel Gets Control of Bratz Dolls, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at C1. 
 2 Colker, supra note 1. 
 3 Jury Rules for Mattel, supra note 1. 
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causes, one of which was copyright infringement.4  The court then 
issued an injunction against MGA.5  Bryant himself settled with 
Mattel.6 
David Miller was employed as the supervisor of the quality 
control laboratory at CP Chemicals, Inc.7  His tasks included 
computerization of analytical data generated in the lab.8  At his 
home, Miller wrote a computer program that assisted him in his 
calculations, with the knowledge of his employer.9  In 1993, a 
district court in South Carolina ruled that the copyright in the 
program belonged to his employer.10 
Who should own Bratz?  Who should own the software Miller 
composed?  Should the law treat different kinds of works in the 
same manner?  Put more generally, who should be the copyright 
owner of creative works made by employees?  Should we treat the 
Bryants and the Millers alike?  This article argues that current legal 
doctrine requires a more solid basis for dealing with the issue of 
ownership of employees’ creative works.  This article suggests that 
we address the allocation of copyright in the workplace by 
conceptualizing the issue under a dual, integrated perspective of 
both copyright law and employment law.11  Surprisingly, such 
 
 4 Phase B Verdict Form as Given at 4, Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. 04-9049 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008), available at  http://www.lawupdates.com/pdf/resources/ 
copyright/Jury_Verdict-08-26-2008-Bryant_v._Mattel,_Inc..pdf.  Other causes of action 
were intentional interference with contractual relations; aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty; and aiding and abetting breach of the duty of loyalty.  Phase B Verdict 
Form as Given at 2, Mattel, No. 04-9049.  One commentator argued, “copyright 
infringement is an indirect and inefficient way to stop a direct competitor from using 
trade secrets misappropriated by a former employee of a competitor.” See Jane Osborne 
McKnight, Disloyal Employees and Trade Secrets: What We Can Learn from Barbies 
and Bratz, 34 VT. B.J. 38, 42 (Fall 2008). 
 5 Order Granting Mattel, Inc.’s Motion for Permanent Injunction, Bryant v. Mattel, 
Inc., No. 04-9049 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008), available at  http://www.lawupdates.com/ 
pdf/postings/copyright/Order-Bryant_v._Mattel.pdf. 
 6 Colker, supra note 1. 
 7 Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (D.S.C. 1992). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 1244. 
 11 Dan Burk addressed the allocation rule from a corporate law point of view, arguing 
that different kinds of intellectual property play a role in demarcating the boundaries of 
property within the firm. See generally Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Burk, Intellectual Property].  His application of 
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integration is absent from current American legal discourse.  The 
discussion here focuses on economic/material rights and leaves 
moral rights for a separate discussion. 
Copyright law in the Anglo-American system addresses this 
allocation via the work-made-for-hire doctrine.12  The doctrine 
provides quite a bright line: works made by employees within the 
scope of their employment belong to the employer; commissioned 
works in specific enumerated categories are also considered works 
made for hire and belong to the commissioning party.13  All other 
works belong to the author.14  In either case, initial ownership can 
be transferred to another party.15  The current work-made-for-hire 
is based on a rather narrow, textual interpretation of the law.  In 
interpreting the legal concepts of employee (the “employment 
element”) and the scope of employment (the “scope element”), 
 
this theory to ownership of copyrighted works suggests that authorship and ownership be 
bifurcated so to protect the reputational interests of the employees. See id. at 11–15; see 
also Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing 
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 635 
[hereinafter Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis] (pointing to the option of 
assigning initial ownership to employees). 
 12 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “work made for hire” as “(1) a work 
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work 
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, 
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an 
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work 
shall be considered a work made for hire.  For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a 
‘supplementary work’ is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work 
by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, 
revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, 
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical 
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an 
‘instructional text’ is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and 
with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities . . . .”); id. § 201(b) (“In the 
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was 
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights 
comprised in the copyright.”); see also discussion infra Part I.C. 
 13 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See id. § 201(d). 
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courts turned to agency law.16  Employment law is strikingly 
absent from this discourse as well as the economic understanding 
of copyright law.17 
Changing modes of production and changing modes of 
employment18 call for a re-examination of the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine and a better understanding of its theoretical 
underpinnings.  The meeting point of copyright law and 
employment law reflects a deeper underlying conflict, between 
efficiency and fairness.  Each body of law struggles with 
reconciling the two principles, and the intersection of the two 
fields enhances the conflict. 
Part I draws an allocation spectrum and maps current legal 
models on it, ranging from full allocation to the 
employer/commissioning party on the one hand if some criteria are 
met, to unwaiveable rights allocated to the 
employee/commissioned party on the other hand.  American law 
provides an example of the former and German law provides an 
example of the latter.  In between there are several other options 
that will be addressed.  Part I also draws lessons from the Supreme 
Court’s 2001 decision in New York Times Co. v. Tasini19 and its 
 
 16 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 490 U.S. 730, 741 (1989).  A 
district court dared to comment on the matter, after CCNV was decided, stating that its 
principles “are difficult to utilize in determining the issue of copyright ownership.” Avtec 
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 92-463-A, 1994 WL 791188, at *4 n.6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 
1994).   Agency law developed in the context of tort law, which does not necessarily fit 
the copyright context. See id.  For criticism on the importation of agency law into 
copyright law, see generally Assaf Jacob, Tort Made for Hire—Reconsidering the CCNV 
Case, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 96 (2008).  Burk and McDonnell argue that agency law 
generally resembles intellectual property law in the way each field divides rights to 
copyrighted works made within the firm. See Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks 
Hypothesis, supra note 11, at 597 (suggesting that this resemblance is either the result of 
both legal fields tracking the most efficient legal rule, or that intellectual property law 
simply drew upon agency law). 
 17 Also absent are antitrust considerations, which otherwise might have been relevant 
in some cases.  For example, the result of the Barbie-Bratz legal dispute is strengthening 
the power of one dominant player. 
 18 See infra Part I.A. 
 19 533 U.S. 483 (2001); see also discussion infra Part I.D. See generally Robertson v. 
Thomson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363 (Can.); Douglas P. Bickham, Extra! Can’t Read All 
About It: Articles Disappear After High Court Rules Freelance Writers Taken Out of 
Context in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 85 (2001) (discussing 
Tasini’s aftermath); Amy Terry, Tasini Aftermath: The Consequences of the Freelancers’ 
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aftermath.  The Court ruled that the republication of freelance 
journalists’ works in digital media infringed their rights,20 a 
decision which resulted in a sweeping change in contracts between 
commissioning parties and independent authors.  Surprisingly, the 
case received relatively little scholarly attention, with a few 
notable exceptions.21 
This article then proceeds to examine copyright law and 
employment law, with the aim of deducing lessons as to the best 
possible initial allocation.  There are several conceptions of each of 
these fields, and thus any attempt to integrate them necessarily has 
to choose which of these conceptions to juxtapose. 
As for copyright law, Part II proceeds within the instrumental, 
incentive-based theory of copyright law, based on by-now familiar 
economic analysis.22  Previous economic analysis addressed the 
allocation of ownership within the workplace only in passing, or 
focused on ex post allocations, i.e., after the copyrighted work had 
 
Victory, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 231 (2004); Andrew Snyder, 
Comment, Pulling the Plug: Ignoring the Rights of the Public in Interpreting Copyright 
Law, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 365 (2002). 
 20 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520. 
 21 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic 
Distribution and Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 473 (2000); Robert A. Gorman & 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Publishers: Adversaries or Collaborators in Copyright 
Law?, in BENJAMIN KAPLAN ET AL., AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, REPUBLISHED: 
(AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) (Iris C. Geik et al. eds., LexisNexis MB 2005) 
(1967); Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The 
Economics of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 90 KY. L.J. 295 (2002). 
 22 See generally Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERS. 3, 11–18 (1991) (emphasizing the 
need to provide authors with incentives to make works in the first place, given the 
likelihood that without legal protection and subject to the costs of copying the work, the 
work would be copied); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in II 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Gordon & Bone, Copyright]; William M. Landes & Richard 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) 
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law].  A different 
point of view focuses on the need to internalize the positive externalities created by a 
work of authorship. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 257, 284–90 (2007). 
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already been made.23  Under the incentive view, I argue that the 
incentives should aim at the risk associated with some aspects of 
creating the work and with the optimal use of the work, for the 
benefit of both the owners and the public.  The public’s interest—
lest we forget—is the goal of copyright law, whereas the rights 
awarded to the author are the means to achieve the public interest 
in promoting the creative process.24 Accordingly, one criterion for 
allocating ownership is identifying the party who bears the risks 
associated with the production of the work.25  Wishing to avoid a 
case-by-case solution and uncertainty, the task is to identify typical 
situations.  The economic analysis of Tasini warns against 
allocations that are to be instantly corrected.  Thus, we should add 
the temporal axis and evaluate different “Coasean moments”26 
when querying the possibility of a corrective transaction.27 
Shaping the allocation default rule28 is thus crucial.  An 
economic intuition would be to design a penalty default rule that 
would allocate initial ownership to the employee, expecting the 
employer to contract around this default rule.29  This expected 
response would act as a signal to the employee that ownership is at 
stake.  I argue that where the unequal power of the parties extends 
beyond information deficiencies, which is the typical situation in 
the employment context, a penalty default rule is likely to fail.  
 
 23 See generally I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law’s Work-
Made-for-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 181 (1988); Parisi & Ševčenko, 
supra note 21. 
 24 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy 
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts.’”). 
 25 Hardy, supra note 23, at 192, 195. 
 26 I borrow the term from Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative 
Research, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 397, 405 (Niva Elkin-Koren & 
Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative 
Research]. 
 27 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
 28 See Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989) (introducing the idea 
of penalty default rules). 
 29 Id. at 91. 
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Moreover, it would cause unnecessary transaction and 
demoralization costs. 
As for employment law, Part III builds on previous literature to 
unpack the conventional description of the employment 
relationship as one of unequal bargaining power.30  Factors internal 
to the employment relationship (bounded rationality, asymmetry of 
information) and external thereto (lock-in costs, hold-out 
problems, the employment market) are identified. Insights 
borrowed from game theory about the difference between one-shot 
games and repeat games add to the understanding of the 
relationship. 
The integrated copyright-employment analysis concludes that 
the law should search for typical cases, in which we can identify ex 
ante the party who bears the risks associated with making the work 
in the first place, usually the employer/commissioning party, while 
assuring informed consent on behalf of the other party, usually the 
employee-author, and avoiding allocations which are likely to be 
instantly corrected by the market without compensation.31  This 
general framework is then further fine-tuned, arguing that the law 
should take into consideration the kind of employer (whether it is a 
cultural industry,32 whether its business model is centralized, e.g., a 
music label, or decentralized, e.g., an independent film producer) 
and the kind of employee (whether he is a “Bryant” or “Miller,” 
i.e., was he hired to make works of authorship or not). 
The conclusion offers moderate support for the current work-
made-for-hire doctrine, with some proposed modifications to the 
interpretation of the scope element of the doctrine.  It also 
advocates greater use of written job descriptions in the creative 
 
 30 Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as a 
Viable (Though Overly-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR 
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 133, 138–43 (Guy Davidov & 
Brian Langille eds., 2006) [hereinafter Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated]. 
 31 See generally Jacob, supra note 16. 
 32 The term “culture industry” originates from THEODORE W. ADORNO, THE CULTURE 
INDUSTRY: SELECTED ESSAYS ON MASS CULTURE (J. M. Bernstein ed., 2001) (1991), who 
used it in the critique of what cultural critics would later call the consumerist society, or 
the society of spectacle, applying the term offered in GUY DEBORD, SOCIETY OF THE 
SPECTACLE (Kenn Knabb trans., New ed. 2006) (1967). 
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employment market.  Thus, this article offers a more solid 
explanation for current law with some interpretive proposals.  
Under this analysis, Mattel should indeed own Bratz, but Miller 
should have owned the software he wrote. 
I. THE ALLOCATION SPECTRUM 
Current legal doctrine contains hidden assumptions about the 
creative process, about cultural markets, about the workplace, and 
about the relationship between employers and employees.  The two 
elements of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, employment and 
scope,33 assume a dichotomous world, in which an author is either 
an employee or an independent contractor;34 in which a work of 
authorship can be created either within the scope of the workplace 
or outside it.35  The result, not surprisingly, is also dichotomous; 
ownership belongs to one party alone.  However, each of these 
factors is more complex and dynamic, and the overall interaction is 
in a constant state of change.  Advanced technology, new business 
models, economic developments, globalization, and changing 
social norms all impact the production of creative works.36  This 
Part briefly comments on these changes (Part I.A), and instead of a 
binary allocation, offers a spectrum of legal choices (Part I.B).37  It 
then adds a legal layer on top of this spectrum (Part I.C).  I discuss 
the U.S. doctrine and the German approach, which is the most 
elaborated existing alternative.  Another aspect of this discussion is 
the way the market responds to the legal layer.  The 2001 Tasini 
case and its aftermath serve as an important lesson for policy 
makers (Part I.D). 
 
 33 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 34 See infra Part I.C.3. 
 35 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 36 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 4–5 (2006). 
 37 For criticism of the binary effect of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, see Nancy S. 
Kim, Martha Graham, Professor Miller and the ‘Work for Hire’ Doctrine: Undoing the 
Judicial Bind Created by the Legislature, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 337 (2006) (proposing a 
particularized analysis that emphasizes the expectations of the parties). 
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A. Modes of Production and Employment 
There are many modes of cultural production.  Patronage 
represents a European medieval form of sponsored creativity.38  
Modern copyright law, dated to the English Statute of Anne of 
1709,39 replaced the patronage system with economic incentives 
for creativity.40  The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed 
the birth of the romantic author, who is apparent in the text and 
sub-text of much of copyright law as we know it.41  This is the 
Author’s Copyright.  The twentieth century saw the rise of the 
Corporate Copyright,42 i.e., works of authorship created within the 
hierarchical setting of a firm, or more generally, the workplace, 
governed by the doctrine of work-made-for-hire.43  Catherine Fisk 
aptly noted that “[t]he author isn’t dead; he just got a job.”44  The 
employed author did not replace the independent author and many 
authors are independent contractors, rather than salaried 
employees.45  The law now treats all workplaces in a unified 
 
 38 See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–17 
(1993). 
 39 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 40 ROSE, supra note 38, at 16–17. 
 41 Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (discussing the romantic author and the law); see also Martha 
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of the Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 425, 426 (1984) (arguing that 
the romantic author is a social construction).  For a different account, see Oren Bracha, 
The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets and Liberal Virtues in Early 
American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 202 (2008). 
 42 Corporate Copyright entered copyright law with the introduction of the work-made- 
for-hire doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909, an amendment which is said to have been 
added “in a most casual manner.” See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE 
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 85–88 (1991); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, 
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT 
THREATENS CREATIVITY 101–03 (2001); Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins 
of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 55–56, 62–67 (2003) 
[hereinafter Fisk, Authors at Work] (providing the history of the doctrine, describing 
corporate copyright as “the ultimate legal fiction underlying modern copyright law,” and 
discussing the enactment of the doctrine in the 1909 Copyright Act). 
 43 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2006). 
 44 Fisk, Authors at Work, supra note 42, at 1. 
 45 Ruth Towse, Copyright Policy, Cultural Policy and Support for Artists, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 66, 68 (Wendy 
J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003) [hereinafter Towse, Copyright Policy].  Ruth 
Towse reports several surveys of artists in several developed countries, all show that 
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manner,46 but one size does not fit all.  A privately owned firm is 
different from the government as an employer, research 
universities are different from a commercial publisher, and a giant 
software firm is different from the local architecture studio.  The 
focus here will be on private firms, leaving aside unique 
considerations that are relevant to particular workplaces.47 
Today, in post-modern times, copyright scholars are 
increasingly aware of other forms of creative production such as 
non-western communal authorship48 and collaborative research.49  
As our lives go digital, more attention is devoted to various forms 
of peer production, such as open source projects and wikis.50  
Nonetheless, corporate copyright, despite the rise of peer 
production, still accounts for a vast amount of works.51 
Working patterns also change.  Technology enables working 
outside the office in many sectors; broadband internet connection 
 
“artists are mostly self-employed, work long hours on short term contracts, and 
experience higher than average unemployment . . . they receive below national average 
earnings.” Id. 
 46 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 9, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE UNDER THE 1976 
COPYRIGHT ACT 1 (2004), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf. 
 47 An important unique consideration in the university context, for example, is 
academic freedom, which is irrelevant to other workplaces.  Judge Posner noted that if 
the issue had to be decided, he might have concluded that the teacher’s exception 
survived the 1976 Act. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416–17 (7th Cir. 
1988). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590 (1987) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, The Creative 
Employee]; Georgia Holmes & Daniel A. Levin, Who Owns Course Materials Prepared 
by a Teacher or Professor? The Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in 
the Internet Age, 2000 BYU EDU. & L.J. 165; Kim, supra note 37, at 357–62; Gregory 
Kent Laughlin, Who Owns Copyright to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire 
Doctrine’s Applicability to Internet Resources Created for Distance Learning and 
Traditional Classroom Courses, 41 B.C. L. REV. 549 (2000).  Works prepared by 
university professors might differ from a school teacher’s preparation of tests. Shaul v. 
Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding 
that a teacher’s preparation of tests falls within the scope of employment, hence copyright 
belongs to the employer). 
 48 Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 285 (2006); see also JAMES BOYLE, 
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 195 (1996). 
 49 See Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, supra note 26, at 405. 
 50 See BENKLER, supra note 36, at 218–19; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth 
Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1493–94 (2007). 
 51 See BENKLER, supra note 36, at 462–63. 
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and wireless access allow employees to work from the home, 
internet café or nearby park.52  Work occurs outside the physical 
location of the workplace and outside the usual working hours.53  
The ubiquity of personal computers further blurs the traditional 
image of the workplace towards a more flexible environment.  The 
result is that it is no longer easy to rely on clear evidence as to the 
time, place and manner of making the work of authorship (the 
traditional scope element of the work-made-for-hire doctrine)54 to 
determine whether it was made within the scope of employment or 
not. 
Globalization further changes the modes of production.  Local 
firms are more active in the global market; firms become 
multinational, spreading production and management in various 
locations around the world and relocating them according to their 
needs.55  Furthermore, firms experience changes in their identity, 
due to bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions. The absence of a 
unified global rule regarding ownership of creative works made 
within the context of the workplace,56 together with different legal 
models applied in various places, require global employees and the 
cosmopolitan authors to figure out the issue themselves. 
B. The Allocation Spectrum 
The law has a wide range of options to choose from regarding 
the initial allocation of ownership of copyrighted works in the 
workplace.  Legislatures face the task of choosing the best point on 
this allocation spectrum and courts face the task of implementing 
the legislative choice of allocation.  The variables that form the 
allocation spectrum are the first owner of the copyrighted work 
(the employer or the employee) and the transferability of the right 
(ranging from a fully transferable right to an inalienable right).  
 
 52 See U.S. Department of Labor, Work at Home in 2004 (Sept. 22, 2005), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/homey.nr0.htm (reporting that in May 2004, 20.7 
million Americans worked at home; 13.7 million of them were wage and salary 
employees). 
 53 Id. 
 54 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 55 See BENKLER, supra note 36, at 4–5. 
 56 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
5.03[B][1][c] (2009). 
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Different jurisdictions chose different points on this allocation 
spectrum; the American model and the recently amended German 
model represent and illustrate the width of the allocation spectrum. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On one end of the allocation spectrum, [1] lays the corporate 
copyright.  The law may award the ownership in the copyrighted 
work to the employer if two conditions are met, which compose 
the work-made-for-hire doctrine: that the work was created by an 
employee, and that the work was made within the scope of 
employment.57  Once these conditions are fulfilled, the employer is 
free to transfer the rights to whomever he or she wishes, whether it 
is a third party or the employee, or to license the use of the work.58  
The employer is free to apply an internal compensation scheme, 
whether it is part of the employment contract or a unilateral 
measure.59  In other words, the employer enjoys full ownership, 
unbounded by the fact that the author was an employee. If the 
conditions are not met, then the ownership vests with the author 
alone, no strings attached [point [4]]. 
 
 57 17 U.S.C. § 101.  The other option under U.S. law is that the parties to the 
transaction agree that the work will be considered as a work-made-for-hire, an option that 
is limited to specific categories of works. Id. 
 58 See id. § 201. 
 59 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 5.03[B][1][ii]. 
1 6 2 3 4 5 
employee employer 
1. Corporate Copyright: Full Employer ownership; 
transferable right 
2. Joint ownership  
3. Shop right 
4. Full employee ownership; transferable right 
5. Initial ownership to employee, with limitations on 
transferability  
6. Inalienable ownership to employee 
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A second possible point, [2], would be to award the initial 
ownership of the work to both parties, i.e., joint ownership of the 
employee and the employer.  Note that this would be a statutory 
allocation, which differs from the current joint ownership rule 
found in the Copyright Act.60  This might seem fair and just and 
hence an attractive solution, but would often be an inefficient 
allocation.  The parties might disagree about how to utilize the 
work, resulting in either overuse by one party, which would be a 
situation of a “tragedy of the commons,”61 or hold-outs by 
employees or inaction by the employer, which would be a situation 
of the tragedy of the anti-commons.62 
Allocation [3] would award the ownership to the employee, but 
would acknowledge the employer’s non-exclusive non-transferable 
right to use the work for free.63  This situation can be viewed as 
either a license under a property rule or as a property rule that is 
shifted into a liability rule.64  This model is borrowed from patent 
 
 60 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the 
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a 
unitary whole.”).  Joint owners are treated as tenants in common, i.e., each of the owners 
has an independent right to use or license the work, though he or she should account to 
the joint owners for any profits. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).  To reach 
a conclusion about joint ownership, a court should find that each author made an 
independently copyrightable contribution to the work. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate Corp. v. 
Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990).  At the time of making the contribution “the 
authors must intend their contributions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.” Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).  
Applying as-is the doctrine to a work made by an employee is unlikely to yield a 
conclusion about joint ownership, as the employer’s contribution might be a general 
instruction to the employee, i.e., an idea how to make a certain work, but not an 
independently copyrightable contribution.  Intention is also unlikely to be shared in the 
way required by the joint ownership rule. 
 61 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 62 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998) (arguing that multiple 
ownerships might result in a deadlock). 
 63 One scholar proposed that in such cases the hiring party might enjoy an implied 
license to use the work. Scott J. Burnham, The Interstices of Copyright Law and Contract 
Law: Finding the Terms of an Implied Nonexclusive License in a Failed Work for Hire, 
46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 333, 351 (1999).  This view inserts contract law principles into 
the copyright law context. 
 64 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972) 
(discussing the distinction between property rules and liability rules). 
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law.65  Patent law does not include a statutory work-made-for-hire 
doctrine, but does acknowledge an equitable doctrine called shop 
right.66  In the absence of a contract between the employee who 
reached an invention using the employer’s facilities, courts base 
the employer’s right to use the invention on implied contract or on 
principles of equity and fairness.67  The right is limited in its scope, 
but allows the use of the invention by the employer without 
transferring it to third parties.68  Incorporating the patent shop right 
in copyright law would result in employee ownership that is 
subject to the employer’s right to use the work.69  The parallel 
entitlement of the employee and the employer is likely to result in 
a problematic commercial management of the work. 
 
 65 For a discussion of ownership of patents within the workplace, see Robert P. 
Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(1999).  Comparison between copyright and patent in this area should be attentive to 
crucial differences between the law, economics and business practices of the creative 
process resulting in a copyrighted work of authorship and the innovation process, 
resulting in a patented invention.  For the differences between copyrighted works and 
patented inventions in this context, see Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis, 
supra note 11, at 594.  First, the financial and legal risks involved in creating copyrighted 
works or patentable inventions are sharply different.  Inventions take place mostly within 
industries and firms. Id.  Second, copyright subsists in an original work once it is created. 
Id.  No registration or publication is required. Id.  Hence, enjoying legal protection is 
immediate and cheap.  Patents, by contrast, require a lengthy and expensive process of 
registration with the Patent Office, and there is no guarantee that the PTO will award the 
patent. See id. at 593.  Third, the patent registration process requires that the owner of the 
invention is asserted. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2006).  Thus, the issue of ownership 
arises in a relatively early point in the relationship between the employer and the 
inventor/employee. 
 66 See McElmurry v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580–82 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (discussing the normative basis of the doctrine and instructing that acknowledging 
the right should be the result of considering the totality of the circumstances on a case by 
case basis).  This rule developed in the common law in the nineteenth century. Id. at 
1580–81.  It was initially based on the employee’s consent and later the theoretical basis 
shifted to the employment contract. Id. at 1581; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
AGENCY § 397 cmt. b (1933).  For a discussion of the roots of the doctrine, see Catherine 
L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the 
Employee-Inventor, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1151–64 (1998) [hereinafter Fisk, Law and 
the Employee-Inventor]. 
 67 Burk, Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 15–16 (explaining the legal basis of 
the doctrine and suggesting that the absence of a work-made-for-hire doctrine might be 
the result of a notion of the romantic inventor). 
 68 Id. at 16. 
 69 Congress refused to incorporate patent shop right in the Copyright Act. See Peter S. 
Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941, 991 (2007). 
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Allocation [4] awards the right to the author-employee with no 
limitations attached so that the employee can do with the work 
whatever he or she wishes, including transferring it to third parties 
or to the employer.  This situation mirrors the allocation to the 
employer [1].  Hence, the points to its right lie beyond the original 
spectrum, or put differently, beyond the Anglo-American 
spectrum.  This is where Continental law enters. 
Allocation [5], which does not have a parallel on the 
employer’s side of the spectrum, would be initial allocation to the 
author, but with some limitations attached to the ownership, or 
more precisely, on the transferability thereof.  For example, the 
law could award the employee the initial ownership and allow her 
to transfer the right but only for a limited time, whereas at the end 
of the limited period, full ownership of the employee would 
resume.  Alternatively, the law could allow the author to terminate 
the transfer under some circumstances, such as if the employer 
fails to utilize the work. 
Allocation [6] awards inalienable ownership to the employee.  
Such a (hypothetical) right would not enable the author-employee-
owner to transfer his or her rights to any party.  However, in order 
to enable some efficiency it should allow the author to grant a non-
exclusive license to use the work.  Such a limited right would be, 
on this theoretical account, accompanied with limitations on 
waiving the rights.  This is an overly paternalistic and extreme 
option, which runs afoul of fundamental principles of the free 
market and of property rights as we know them.70 However, in 
some jurisdictions the case of moral rights does not fall far from 
this option.71  Moral rights are often inalienable and some 
 
 70 For a similar point regarding real property, see generally RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW]. 
 71 See Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 
208–09 (1995) (discussing the concept of inalienable moral rights in Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovac Republic and the author’s ability to allow 
so-called concessions (licenses) of rights to use work which can be granted as non-
exclusive or exclusive rights for all uses, limited or unlimited as to place, time and 
purpose); Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 
372–79 (2006) (discussing an author’s application of moral rights in France, Germany 
and Italy against persons authorized to use the copyright by contract). 
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jurisdictions prohibit waiving them.72  Further, unwaiveable rights 
are not a foreign concept in employment law.73 
More points could be added to the allocation spectrum. Indeed, 
the choice of the point of allocation differs among different 
jurisdictions.  Thus far we have seen the range of options. Before 
we turn to a normative analysis, I would like to super-impose the 
legal layer upon the spectrum. 
C. The Law: Two Models 
Several current legal models illustrate the allocation spectrum, 
roughly divided into two main manifestations: the first is the 
Anglo-American model, namely the U.S. model and the U.K. 
model,74 which is found also in other jurisdictions where English 
law has influenced the legal system,75 and the second is the Civil 
Law model.76  The general rule under both models vests the initial 
 
 72 Inalienability of moral rights is mostly a European Continental phenomenon, though 
there is no uniformity among countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. See Dietz, supra note 71, at 220–21. 
 73 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006) (setting minimum 
wages, maximum hours and child labor provisions). 
 74 Compare Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 11(2) (Eng.) (“Where a 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is made by an employee in the course of his 
employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work subject to any 
agreement to the contrary.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work 
made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly 
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised 
in the copyright.”). 
 75 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 13(3) (1985) (“Where the 
author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service 
or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, 
the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to 
the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright . . . .”).  This is based on the English Act 
of 1911, Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.). J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD 
COPYRIGHT LAW 983 (1998).  See also a case recently decided by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal of South Africa, King v. SA Weather Service 2008 (143) SCA (S. Afr.). 
 76 This is an admitted generalization for the clarity of the discussion.  For a survey of 
copyright law in several Civil Law jurisdictions, see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF 
EUROPE 62, 103, 221, 270, 335, 356, 373, 423 (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995) 
(discussing the ownership of works created by employees in Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland); STERLING, supra note 75, at 169–70, 352 
(1998) (discussing French, German, Greek, and Dutch law); KENNETH D. CREWS & 
JACQUE RAMOS, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
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ownership with the author,77 but diverges after this first step.  
Common law jurisdictions accompany the initial allocation to the 
author with an explicit or implicit permission to transfer the 
(material) rights,78 and with rules addressing works made for 
hire.79  If the statutory conditions for a work-made-for-hire are 
met, then the initial allocation lies not with the author but with the 
employer.80  In such a case, the employer is considered to be the 
legal author.81  In contrast, the German model allows the author to 
grant the right to use the work (“exploitation right”), but the 
ownership remains with the author, even if the work was created 
by an employee within the scope of the employment.82 
1. U.S. Initial Allocation 
Under the U.S. model, there are two situations in which a work 
might be considered a work-made-for-hire.  The first refers to 
works made by employees and by implication excludes 
independent contractors, subject to the general rule that an author 
is the owner of the original work he or she made.83  The second 
 
ISSUES FOR UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIP (2005),  http://copyright.surf.nl/copyright/files/ 
International_Comparative_Chart_Zwolle_III_rev071306.pdf; CHRISTINE KIRCHBERGER 
ET AL., OWNERSHIP OF THE COPYRIGHT IN WORKS AND THE PATENT RIGHT IN INVENTIONS 
CREATED BY EMPLOYEES IN FINLAND, SWEDEN, GERMANY, AUSTRIA, THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, ESTONIA AND ARGENTINA (2002), http://www.juridicum.su.se/user/sawo/Pub 
likationer/Wolk%20nr%20120.pdf. 
 77 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in 
the author or authors of the work . . . .”); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, 
§ 11(1) (Eng.) (“The author of a work is the first owner of any copyright in it . . . .”); 
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] 
[Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31 (F.R.G.).  For an English translation, see 
Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Law), 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/de/de080en.pdf. 
 78 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, § 90  
(Eng.). 
 79 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, §  
11(2) (Eng.). 
 80 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, §  
11(2) (Eng.). 
 81 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48, §  
11(2) (Eng.). 
 82 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31 (F.R.G.). 
 83 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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situation refers to commissioned works, and will be discussed 
shortly. 
For the employer to own the work, the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine requires proving two elements: employment, and a causal 
connection between the work and the employment, i.e., that it was 
made within the scope of employment.84  If these elements are met, 
the employer is considered the first owner of the copyright, even 
though the employee was the author.85  On the allocation spectrum 
this would be point [1].86  Initial allocation means that there is no 
transfer of the copyright from the author-employee to the 
employer, but rather that the employer is the first owner.87  If the 
author is not an employee or the work was made outside the scope 
of employment, then the initial ownership vests with the author 
[point [4] of the allocation spectrum].88  In either case, there is no 
legal barrier prohibiting the parties to contract around the initial 
allocation as they see fit, be it before or after the work is made.89 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. § 201 (b). 
 86 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 87 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b). 
 88 See supra Part I.B; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 
5.03[B][1][b][i], [ii].  Such post-allocation would be a transfer of the copyright and 
should not be confused with the initial allocation.  The distinction matters.  Some rules 
that apply to a work-made-for-hire do not apply to other works.  For example, a work of 
visual art that enjoys some moral rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) does not apply to a 
work-made-for-hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Another difference is the duration of a work-
made-for-hire. See id. § 302(c) (“In the case of . . . a work made for hire, the copyright 
endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years 
from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.”).  A third important difference is 
that while ordinary transfers of copyright ownership can be terminated under some 
conditions, a work-made-for-hire is ineligible for such termination. See id. § 203(a)(3).  
For discussion, see David Nimmer, Peter S. Menell & Diane McGimsey, Pre-Existing 
Confusion in Copyright’s Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 399 (2003).  
For a full discussion of the implications of treating a work as made for hire, see NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 5.03[A].  Moreover, transactions done after initial 
allocation might have tax implications. Id. § 19.03[B], 19.03[B][.05]. 
 89 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (stating that an employer is the author of a work-made-for-
hire, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a signed writing). 
C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:47:12 AM 
114 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:95 
2. Agency Law in Copyright Law 
The statute is silent as to the details of either element of the 
work-made-for-hire, leaving their interpretation to the courts.  
Initially, courts turned to various tests found in employment law to 
determine who is an employee and to determine the scope of 
employment: (1) a “control test,” i.e., whether the hiring party 
retained the right to control the product; (2) an examination of 
whether the hiring party actually had such control; (3) a formal 
test, acknowledging employment only when the other party was a 
salaried employee; or (4) an interpretation borrowed from agency 
law.90  In evaluating who is an employee, the Supreme Court opted 
for an agency law test.91  The Court adopted a rather formalistic 
and conservative interpretation, deferring to Congress, and relying 
on the text and structure of the Copyright Act.92  The legislative 
history, as analyzed by the Court, supported this interpretation.93 
The agency test provided a list of inconclusive factors to be 
considered on an ad hoc basis.94  While it might have clarified 
 
 90 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738–40 (1989) (discussing 
various tests); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 5.03[B][1][a].  The 
distinction between salaried employees (those who are under a contract of service) and 
independent contractors who provide their services to a hiring party (those under a 
contract for service) is a bedrock principle of the Common Law and is reflected in the 
language of the Canadian model, which is based on the old English model. See Canada 
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 139 13(3) (1985). 
 91 CCNV, 490 U.S at 742–43. 
 92 Id. at 739–40.  For discussion, see Jacob, supra note 16.  Nimmer explains that the 
Court’s standard focuses on the right to control the manner and means of production 
rather than the product itself. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 
5.03[B][1][a][iii]. 
 93 See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 743–49.  One scholar argued that the Court misinterpreted 
the legislative history and created an uncertain test. Michael B. Landau, “Works Made for 
Hire” After Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: The Need for Statutory 
Reform and the Importance of Contract, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 148–49 
(1990) (advocating the amendment of the Copyright Act to incorporate the formal 
“salaried employee” test). 
 94 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751.  Factors used to determine whether a hired party is an 
employee under common law of agency include: 
[T]he hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished . . . ; the skill required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of 
the relationship between the  parties; whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the 
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which legal standard should be applied, the test itself remains 
foggy and difficult to anticipate or to apply.95  Uncertainty affects 
the parties’ behavior, to the extent that they are aware of it.  Those 
who know about the test applied by courts might opt for contracts, 
pre-assigning the ownership. 
In interpreting the scope element, courts again turned to agency 
law and applied a three-prong test.96  Accordingly, a work is 
considered to have been made within the scope of employment if 
(1) it is of the kind for which the employee was hired; and (2) the 
work was made substantially within the time and space limits, and 
(3) the work was made, at least in part, with a purpose to serve the 
employer’s interests.97  Later on we shall return to the agency test. 
 
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method 
of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; 
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 95 The Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit, applying the CCNV tests, noted that 
“[t]he Reid test is a list of factors not all of which may come into play in a given case.  
The Reid test is therefore easily misapplied.” Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 
85 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  Ironically, the Supreme Court in CCNV pointed to 
predictability and certainty as Congress’ paramount goal in enacting the 1976 Copyright 
Act. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 749; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 56, § 
5.03[B][1][a][iii]. 
 96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (2000).  Shortly after CCNV was 
decided, one commentator advocated applying the agency test to the scope element. See 
Robert A. Kreiss, Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Made-
for-Hire Provision of the Copyright Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40 
U. KAN. L. REV. 119 (1991).  The justifications provided for this approach are cannons of 
statutory interpretation and the convenience of providing a developed framework. Id. at 
131–32.  I find both reasons unconvincing, as the statute is silent about the meaning of 
the elements of the work-made-for-hire doctrine and the need for a framework does not in 
itself justify the particular choice.  Kreiss himself struggled with applying doctrines 
admittedly taken from the context of tort law. See id. at 129–30 (speculating about the 
third test of the agency element of the scope element); id. at 139 (trying to justify the 
arbitrary effect of borrowing tort law concepts by inserting them in the copyright law 
context). 
 97 See, e.g., Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 94-2364, 1995 WL 541610, at *4 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 13, 1995) (applying the Agency test and noting that all three elements must be 
considered); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571–72 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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Importantly, as noted by Assaf Jacob, the agency law tests are 
derived from tort law, rather than from an independent analysis of 
employment law.98 
3. Independent Contractors 
An important difference between the U.S. and U.K. models is 
found in the situation of a commissioned work.  Current U.K. law 
is silent about commissioned works, subjecting them to the general 
rule that the author is the copyright owner and leaving any 
subsequent transfers entirely to the market:99 the author can 
transfer his or her rights to the commissioner of the work.100  U.S. 
law treats commissioned works as works made for hire only if 
three conditions are met:101 first, that the work was specially 
ordered or commissioned;102 second, that the work is to be used for 
at least one of nine listed statutory categories, such as a 
contribution to a collective work, a motion picture or an 
instructional text;103 and third, that the parties expressly agreed in a 
 
 98 Jacob, supra note 16, at 124. 
 99 The U.K. Copyright Act, 1911 addressed commissioned works of a particular kind: 
Where, in the case of an engraving, photograph or portrait, the plate 
or other original was ordered by some other person and was made for 
valuable consideration, in pursuance of that order, in the absence of 
any agreement to the contrary, the person by whom the plate or other 
original was ordered shall be the first owner of the copyright. 
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 5(1)(a) (Eng.).  This special treatment was 
eliminated in subsequent Acts. 1 COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT §§ 5–32 
(Kevin Garnett et al. eds., 15th ed. 2005). 
 100 In the U.K., the transfer can be explicit, i.e., in a written contract, or implicit. See 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 c. 48, § 90(a) (Eng.).  Indeed, courts found that 
there was an equitable transfer of rights in some circumstances. See WILLIAM R. CORNISH 
& DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS 
AND ALLIED RIGHTS 472 (5th ed. 2003); SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 156–59 
(2001). 
 101 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  For the legislative history of this prong of the doctrine, 
see Nimmer, Menell & McGimsey, Pre-Existing Confusion, supra note 88. 
 102 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 103 Id.  The enumerated categories require explanation for their inclusion in the statute, 
as well as the categories missing from the list. One possible answer is political, and 
suggests that the categories are the result of successful political pressure by interested 
groups. Burk, Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 13; see also Matt Stahl, Recording 
Artists, Work for Hire, Employment and Appropriation 1–3 (Oct. 23, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1288831 (discussing the rather  
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written and signed instrument that the work shall be considered a 
work-made-for-hire.104  This means that works commissioned for 
other purposes or works commissioned with no specific written 
agreement remain the author’s.105  The author is free to license or 
transfer the copyright as he or she sees fit.106 Accordingly, the 
question which may arise is whether the work falls within the 
category of a commissioned work to begin with and if the answer 
is positive, then disputes might evolve around the interpretation of 
the contract between the commissioning party and the author. 
4. The German Model 
Civil Law provides a different model for ownership of 
employees’ works.107  The general approach is that the author is 
the initial owner if the work is made within the scope of the 
employment,108 as in points [4], [5] or [6].109  Civil law 
jurisdictions differ on their choice among these points.  
Interestingly, even when the choice is [4], in which the employee 
can freely transfer his or her rights to anyone, the law sets some 
boundaries to this transfer or grant of exploitation rights, namely 
the transfer is subject to a principle of “limited purpose”: This 
limitation means that if the contract is unclear or incomplete, the 
transfer of rights or the license granted are interpreted narrowly, to 
cover only those rights that are related to the employment and 
leaving any residual rights to the author.110 
 
curious case of sound recordings which were added to the list of enumerated categories 
and then eliminated).  A second explanation suggests that the enumerated categories are 
works that require multi-party coordination. Id. at 12–14. 
 104 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. § 201(d). 
 107 An important exception to the Civil law model, found in the European Union, 
instructs that material rights in software prepared by employees belong to the employer. 
See Council Directive 91/250, art. 2(3), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 42–46 (EC); 
KIRCHBERGER, supra note 76, at 7–8 (explaining that the Directive was implemented 
throughout the E.U.). 
 108 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 109 See discussion in text supra Part I.B. 
 110 See KIRCHBERGER, supra note 76, at 10, 13–14. 
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The German Copyright Act111 provides an elaborate scheme of 
ownership or more precisely, a detailed regulation of copyright 
contracts.  The Act was amended in 2002112 and again in 2007.113  
Under current German law, the ownership is allocated to the 
author,114 who cannot transfer the rights.  However, the author can 
allow other parties, including the employer,115 to use the work.  
This is the exploitation right (Nutzungsrecht),116 which was 
 
 111 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at 1273 (F.R.G.), available at Gesetz im 
Internet, http://bundesrecht.juris.de.   For an English translation, see Law on Copyright 
and Neighboring Rights (Copyright Law),  
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/de/de080en.pdf. 
 112 See Gesetz zur Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden 
Künstlern [Act on Strengthening the Contractual Position of Authors and Performers], 
Mar. 28, 2002, BGBl. I at 1155 (F.R.G.).  For a summary of the 2002 amendment and its 
legislative history, see generally Bettina C. Goldmann, New Law on Copyright Contracts 
in Germany, 9 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 17 (2002).  For analysis, see Reto M. Hilty & 
Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration” in Copyright Law: The Amended German 
Copyright Act as a Trap for the Entertainment Industry in the U.S.?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 401, 416–21 (2004). See generally Gerhard Schricker, Efforts for a Better 
Law on Copyright Contracts in Germany—A Never-Ending Story?, 35 INT’L REV. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 850 (2004) (discussing the German Copyright Act and 
the 2002 amendment and its implications). 
 113 See Second Act Governing Copyright in the Information Society [Second Basket], 
Jan. 1, 2008, BGBl. I at 2513 (F.R.G.), available at  http://www.bgblportal.de/BGBL/ 
bgbl1f/bgbl107s2513.pdf.   The 2007 amendment,  popularly referred to as the “second 
basket” of amendments of the copyright act for the information society, deals with 
various other aspects, which are not discussed in this article, such as compensation for 
owners for private copying and uses of public libraries. See id.  The amendment entered 
into force on January 1, 2008.  For commentary, see generally Stefan Krempl, German 
Parliament Passes New Copyright Act, HEISE ONLINE, July 6, 2007, 
http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/92318.  I am indebted to Zohar Efroni and 
Clemens Kochinke for their assistance with German copyright law. 
 114 See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 11 (F.R.G.) (“Copyright shall protect 
the author . . . with respect to utilization of his work.”). 
 115 Id. § 43 (applying articles dealing with the exploitation rights to an author who has 
“created the work in execution of his duties under a contract of employment or service 
provided nothing to the contrary transpires from the terms or nature of the contract of 
employment or service.”); see also Schricker, supra note 112, at 852.  For discussion of 
the German legal framework, see KIRCHBERGER, supra note 76, at 13–15. 
 116 See Schricker, supra note 112, at 852. 
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described by a leading German copyright scholar as a “sort of 
surrogate for the assignment of copyright.”117 
The law imposes further limitations on the author’s power to 
make transactions and provides her with a set of (protective) rights, 
as well as supportive background rules.118  Located on the 
allocation spectrum, the German model is best understood to be in 
between points [5] and [6].  Several rules in the German Copyright 
Act empower the employee-author vis-à-vis the employer.  First, 
any grant of exploitation rights is interpreted according to the 
purpose of the grant.119  However, it is reported that this limitation 
on the transferability is bypassed by contracts which attempt to 
detail every possible use.120  One can assume that the more 
sophisticated parties bypass this limitation more often than the less 
sophisticated ones.121  Second, uses of the work which were not 
bargained for by the parties ex ante, are not granted automatically 
to the employer, but are to be determined.122  Until the 2007 
amendment came into force in 2008, the law voided the grant of 
unknown uses.123  For example, a contract regarding an analog 
work created at a time that no digitization technology was 
available could not address (then) future digital uses, but if it 
nevertheless did attempt to allow such future uses, the contractual 
clause granting the exploitation rights was considered void.124  The 
 
 117 Id. at 852.  Karl-Nikolaus Peifer pointed to me that the literal translation of 
Nutzungsrecht is “usage right”. 
 118 See id. at 852–56. 
 119 See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(5) (F.R.G.). 
 120 See Schricker, supra note 112, at 853. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(5) (F.R.G.); Schricker, supra note 
112, at 853. 
 123 See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(4) (F.R.G.); Schricker, supra note 
112, at 853–854 (noting in 2004 before the 2007 amendment that “Amazingly, the courts 
show a tendency to restrict the range of application of Sec. 31(4).”). 
 124 See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 31(4) (F.R.G.); Schricker, supra note 
112, at 853; see also Press Release, Bundesministerium der Justiz (German Federal 
Ministry of Justice), German Budenstag Adopts Copyright Law Reform (July 5, 2007) 
[hereinafter Ministry of Justice Press Release]. 
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2007 amendment allows copyright owners to grant licenses to use 
their works in yet unknown ways.125  However, the permission is 
accompanied by a detailed mechanism, under which the user 
should notify the author (who is the copyright owner) of the new 
intended use.126  The author then has a window of three months to 
revoke the right and is entitled to a reasonable remuneration, if the 
exploiter uses the work in the formerly unknown manner.127  The 
author’s right to withdraw the grant of exploitation rights of the 
new uses is also limited and expires upon the death of the 
author.128 Third, the employee has some control over subsequent 
transfers of the exploitation rights.129 Fourth, the 2002 amendment 
allowed the author to renegotiate the terms of the contract if the 
compensation is inequitable.130  The amendment lists some 
conditions and specifies various standards for such equity.131  The 
right is operative if the difference between the reward to the author 
and the proceeds is “conspicuous.”132  The right to modify the 
contract is limited when a collective labor agreement applies.133  
Fifth, the law instructs that the grants of exploitation rights are to 
be interpreted narrowly, so whenever in doubt, the disputed uses of 
 
 125 See Ministry of Justice Press Release, supra note 124 (explaining that the German 
Copyright Act, § 31(4) was stricken out and replaced with new § 31a–31c). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id.; see also Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte 
[Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 34(1) (F.R.G.) 
(“An exploitation right may be transferred only with the author’s consent.”).  The Act 
also limits the power of the author, “The author may not unreasonably refuse his 
consent.” Id. § 35 (explaining the grant of non-exclusive exploitation rights by the holder 
of an exclusive right). 
 130 See Schricker, supra note 112, at 854 (explaining how the German Copyright Act, § 
32a, enacted in 2002, replaced § 36). 
 131 See id. at 855. 
 132 See Karsten M. Gutsche, Equitable Remuneration for Authors in Germany—How 
the German Copyright Act Secures Their Rewards, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 257, 
264–65 (2003) (proposing an escalating royalties’ rates scheme instead of lump-sum 
remunerations). 
 133 Id. at 268. See generally Goldmann, supra note 112.  Collective labor agreements 
might play an important role in evening the unequal bargaining power of the parties. 
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the work remain the author’s.134  Sixth, the law allows agreements 
regarding future works, but the author has an unwaiveable right to 
terminate the grant after five years.135  Seventh, the employee-
author has an unwaiveable right of revoking the exploitation right, 
in some circumstances.136 
The complex German model illustrates that there are 
alternatives to the binary allocation rule that attempt to balance the 
commercial needs with the authors’ interests.  The different 
choices reflect the underlying rationales of copyright law and 
employment law. 
D. Freelancers 
Freelancers are independent contractors that remain the owners 
of the rights in the works they made, unless they transfer the 
rights.137  The common copyright disputes involving freelancers 
turn on interpreting the scope of the license granted by the 
freelancer, usually a journalist, to the corporate user, usually a 
newspaper.138  More concretely, disputes emerge when the contract 
mentions a specific use but the commissioning party uses the work 
for other uses.139  The question is then whether the new use (e.g., 
online publication) is similar to the agreed upon use (e.g., print 
publication). 
In Tasini, the defendant newspapers used articles written by 
freelance journalists not only according to the original agreed-upon 
use, namely in the print newspaper, but also in digital databases 
(CDs and online services) of third parties.140  The suit was based 
 
 134 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I § 37 (F.R.G.).  This rule has an exception 
in cases of collective works. Id. § 38. 
 135 Id. § 40. 
 136 Id. §§ 41, 42 (revocation for non-use and revocation for changed conviction). 
 137 See discussion supra Part I.C.3. 
 138 See, e.g., Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that 
in cases where only the scope of the license is at issue, the copyright owner bears the 
burden of proving that the defendant’s copying was unauthorized). 
 139 See, e.g., Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 171 
(D.D.C. 1992) (noting that prohibition of a specific use does not indicate an intent to 
prohibit other uses). 
 140 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001). 
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on § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of the 
copyright in a collective work to reproduce the separate 
contributions to the collection, only as part of the collection or as a 
revision of the collection.141  The Supreme Court ruled in a 7–2 
decision in favor of the journalists, finding that the digital 
republication was not a revision of the original collective work and 
accordingly, that the publishers were not authorized to use the 
articles in the way they did.142  Leaving aside the comparison of 
different media and whether this technological/legal interpretation 
is correct or not,143 Tasini’s main lesson for our inquiry lies not in 
the judicial decision itself, but in the aftermath of the case. 
Following the decision, the newspapers changed their 
contractual relationship with the freelancer journalists, so that the 
latter were required to transfer all possible rights to the newspapers 
and in some cases, they were required to do so retroactively.144  
Furthermore, the newspapers deleted thousands of articles from 
 
 141 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2006) reads: 
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is 
distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests 
initially in the author of the contribution.  In the absence of an 
express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner 
of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only 
the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part 
of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective 
work, and any later collective work in the same series. 
 142 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488.  Following the decision, a district court allowed a class 
action suit by the freelancers and later approved a settlement of a total of 18 million 
dollars. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 120 (2d 
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009). 
However, the court of appeals voided the settlement, finding that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to certify a class, which included works that were not registered. See id. at 
120–21. 
 143 See generally Lateef Mtima, Tasini and its Progeny: The New Exclusive Right or 
Fair Use on the Electronic Publishing Frontier?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 369 (2004) (discussing the fate of revisions of collective works, i.e., 
republications of works in a different format, usually a digital format). 
 144 This new contractual relationship was upheld in Marx v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 
15 Mass. L. Rptr. 400 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002), where the court found in favor of the 
newspaper.  The new freelancer agreement read in relevant part that the freelancer grants 
the Globe for no additional fee, “a non-exclusive, fully-paid up, worldwide license to use 
all of the works that the Globe has previously accepted from [the freelancer], if any.” Id. 
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various databases.145  Thus, one of the challenges freelancers face 
in the post-Tasini era is how to compensate for their low 
bargaining power.146 
The case of freelancers highlights the core of the problem, 
which is shared by the work-made-for-hire doctrine:147 
occasionally a work turns out to have new, previously unforeseen 
uses.  When neither party expected this happy outcome, the 
unforeseen use was not bargained for.  The binary legal doctrine 
results in a winner take all situation—either the employee owns the 
work or the employer does—much to the dismay of the losing 
party, who feels that he or she was tricked or that the initial deal 
was unfair.148  We shall return to fairness later on. 
Parisi and Ševčenko portray the freelancer-publishers 
relationship as an anti-commons situation.149  They note that the 
easiest solution in the case would have been to compensate the 
freelance authors and transfer the digital publication rights to the 
publishers.150  However, they point to the asymmetric transaction 
costs involved in such a corrective transaction.151  While it is easy 
and cheap to split the bundle of rights which constitutes the 
copyright, it is expensive to reverse the division and reunify the 
fragmented copyrights.152  The high costs are a combination of 
tracing all freelance authors affected by the decision, negotiating 
with them and overcoming attempts by some freelancers to hold-
 
 145 See Bickham, supra note 19, at 85–86, 103–04; Gorman & Ginsburg, supra note 21, 
at 9 (“In this tug-of-war between author and publisher, the former won the litigation 
battle but not necessarily the economic war.”); Terry, supra note 19, at 238; Snyder, 
supra note 19, at 365.  Landes and Posner describe the decision as unfortunate from an 
economic standpoint, since it increases transaction costs without enhancing the incentives 
to create. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 273–74 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]. 
 146 Interesting options are to unionize or create a collective rights organization. See 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 626–34 (2003). 
 147 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 148 See Jacob, supra note 16, at 134. 
 149 See Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 309–10. 
 150 See id. at 297. 
 151 Id. at 302–03; see also LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 
145, at 273–74. 
 152 See Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 303. 
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out for higher compensation.153  This analysis refers to the 
allocation of copyright that takes place after the initial relationship 
between the parties has been established, when no pre-assignment 
was agreed upon.154 
The case of freelance authors highlights some lessons which 
can be carried to the employment context.  First, we should not 
limit our discussion to works that have already been created, but 
extend our inquiry to previous points on the timeline.  Particularly, 
we should notice the pre-employment phase.  Second, both 
employers and employees adjust their behavior to the law and 
continue to do so when the law changes.  A legal rule that seems to 
empower the weaker party might turn out to be more damaging.  In 
Coasean terms, this is a corrective transaction.155  The Coase 
theorem states that when transaction costs are negligible, the initial 
allocation does not matter since the parties will reallocate the 
resources at stake.156  Of course, the distribution of wealth among 
the parties matters to the parties and in the case of copyright it 
might matter to the public at large.  In shaping the legal rule of first 
allocation, we should hypothesize whether the rule is likely to be 
corrected by the market, and if so, would that be a positive 
correction.  In terms of overall welfare, a corrective transaction is 
efficient, but we should explore its distributive effect.  In the 
aftermath of Tasini, the publishers improved their situation at the 
expense of the journalists and the public at large.157 
* * * 
Thus far we have considered the multiplicity of modes of 
creative production and the changing conditions of the workplace; 
replaced the binary option that current law offers with a spectrum 
of allocation possibilities and mapped current legal models on this 
 
 153 See id. at 311.  A possible solution offered by Parisi and Ševčenko turns to the fair 
use defense. Id. at 323.  More broadly, they suggest that the choice of remedy can solve 
Tasini’s anti-commons problem by shifting from a property rule to a liability rule. Id. at 
325. 
 154 See id. at 311. 
 155 See Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1232 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). 
 156 Coase, supra note 27, at 15 (reasoning that in a market with costless transactions, 
parties will rearrange their rights to increase the value of production). 
 157 See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
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spectrum; and reflected upon some lessons from the freelancers’ 
cases.  We can now turn to the theoretical underpinnings of 
copyright law to search for guidance. 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW: RISKS AND INCENTIVES 
Under the economic analysis of copyright law, the rights 
accorded to authors serve as incentives to make works of 
authorship, which otherwise might not have been made.  The 
discussion in this part follows this economic logic.  Applying this 
understanding to the employment context instructs us to search for 
the party who bears the risk associated with making the work.158  
In most cases, this would be the employer. 
Whatever the law’s initial allocation might be, under an 
economic analysis the law should enable the parties to contract 
around the initial allocation, either ex ante, i.e., before the 
employment relationship is established and before the work is 
made, or ex post, after the work is made.159  Setting the allocation 
as a default rule rather than an inalienable allocation reflects the 
importance of facilitating a free market and our commitment to 
freedom of contract.160 It also enables the market to correct 
inefficient allocations.  Accordingly, after searching for the best 
risk-bearer (Part II.A), this part inserts Coasean analysis into the 
copyright-employment context, arguing that we should 
contemplate not only the initial legal allocation, but consider, to 
the extent possible, the option that the parties will change the 
initial allocation.  This discussion leads us to search for the best 
default rule (Part II.B).  The economic analysis and the interest to 
avoid a case-by-case finding, instruct us to identify typical 
situations (Part II.C).  Accordingly, I suggest that we search for 
 
 158 See Jacob, supra note 16, at 124–26.  The work-made-for-hire doctrine is interpreted 
so to achieve the constitutional goals of copyright law, of providing incentives to create 
works and public access to such works.  Note that the argument made here need not 
contradict Jacob’s argument. 
 159 See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1410 (2009) (“Coasean experiments in contract bargains 
seek to show that initial allocations of rights do not matter if the parties are able to 
contract around those allocations in a cost-free manner.”). 
 160 Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 108 (2002). 
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relevant criteria to shape these categories; three such main criteria 
are the work, the kind of employer, and the kind of employee. 
A. Identifying the Risk-Bearer 
1. Copyright Incentives 
Under an instrumental conception, copyright law is a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself.  The goal of copyright law is 
described in general terms, such as “the encouragement of 
learning” (in the words of the 1709 English Statue of Anne),161 or 
“to promote the progress of science” (in the words of the U.S. 
Constitution).162  The goal benefits the public, and the right 
accorded to the author helps achieve that goal.163  Copyright is 
understood as an incentive to the would-be author in that it 
prohibits most unlicensed uses of his or her copyrighted work by 
others.164 
The protection against unlicensed uses is needed due to the 
economic features of intangible works as public goods.165  Absent 
a law prohibiting the copying of the work, it is likely to be copied 
and a market failure is likely to occur.166  The law intervenes so to 
restore the functionality of the market, by prohibiting the use of the 
work (unless the owner consents to the use), imposing sanctions on 
the infringer and providing the owner with a set of remedies. The 
law thus creates a legal fence around the intangible work and raises 
the costs of copying, which include not only the actual costs of 
copying (such as obtaining access and paying for the use of a 
photocopy machine) but also the legal risks.  The higher cost of 
copying affects its feasibility and profitability. 
 
 161 Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 162 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 163 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 164 See Gordon & Bone, Copyright, supra note 22, at 189; Landes & Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 326. 
 165 See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 
326. 
 166 See Alan Devlin et al., Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157, 
1173 (2009). 
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2. Copyright Risks 
Thus understood, copyright clears some obstacles and risks 
from the author’s path.  But copyright does not clear all potential 
hurdles and does not guarantee success in the market.  It does not 
carry any promise to the owners that they will recoup their initial 
investment.  An author might invest time and effort worth ten 
thousand dollars to write a book; a music company might invest a 
hundred thousand dollars in producing a CD; a studio might invest 
a hundred million dollars in producing a movie.  But nevertheless, 
all these works might fail in the market. Investment and copyright 
protection do not guarantee success. 
Copyright law will provide the owner with tools to prevent 
others from copying the works without permission.167  The absence 
of free copies—assuming enforcement is effective—might 
influence the price and the sales.  The copyright owner might 
charge a higher price and so recover some of the expenses.  
Copyright further enables the owner to rely on some distribution 
avenues.  For example, music producers can rely on online 
distribution of the music.  This is because the law treats the work 
as copyrighted and the copyright provides the rights of distribution 
and public performance.168  Thus, self-help mechanisms such as 
Digital Rights Management (DRM)169 and para-copyright legal 
protections such as the anti-circumvention rules of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)170 ensure that online 
distribution is a (legally speaking) safe avenue.  Of course, 
enforcement has its own costs. 
But copyright has nothing to do with the total revenue.  The 
book might be a best seller, earning millions for the author.  The 
CD or movie might turn out to be a complete failure in the market.  
What does it take to turn a book into a best seller and a movie into 
a blockbuster? This is a multi-million dollar question, but the 
answer is not found in the realm of copyright. Moreover, copyright 
 
 167 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating a copyright holder’s exclusive rights). 
 168 Id. 
 169 See generally Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and 
Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2004). 
 170 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
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is a necessary tool for some authors and owners, but not for all.  
Some dedicate their work to the public domain or allow various 
uses of the code they composed or the books they wrote and 
nevertheless make money.171  Copyright law is not in itself akin to 
winning a lottery ticket; it just assures that no one takes your 
ticket. 
Thus, marketing cultural products requires two kinds of costs.  
First, is the cost of expression, i.e., the costs related to the actual 
production, such as time, effort, labor, and payments to other 
copyright owners for using their content as raw material.  Second 
is the cost of producing copies, and marketing and handling the 
sales and managing the business, or more generally, the cost of 
commercializing the work.  This can be rephrased as the costs of 
achieving optimal exploitation of the work.172 
The risks, accordingly, correspond to two stages in the life-
cycle of the work: the creation, and the commercializing.173  
Copyright law lowers the risk associated with the first stage by 
offering the owner some guarantee that the initial costs will not be 
rendered irrelevant by unwanted third parties, but it does not 
obliterate the second risk.  The author might invest a substantial 
amount in making the work and nevertheless might lose the entire 
investment without any right being infringed. 
3. Shifting Risks in the Workplace 
How should the law consider the various costs and risks 
described above in devising the rule of initial allocation of 
ownership between the employer and the employee?  Rephrased in 
the incentive theory’s terms, the question is who needs the 
incentive?  Is it the employee or the employer?  The risks 
 
 171 See STERLING, supra note 75, at 253.  The Open Source GNU/Linux license or 
Creative Commons license offers ready mechanisms to allow certain uses in a cheaper 
way than individually-tailored licenses.  
 172 Writing about real property, Posner notes that the law should allocate the resource to 
the party who can best use it productively and can incur the costs. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 70, at 81; see also Landes & Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 326 (defining exploitation of a creative 
work). 
 173 See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 
326–27. 
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associated with making the work in the first place are a strong 
proxy for locating the incentives.174  There should be a correlation 
between the party who bears the costs and the risks and the 
copyright, i.e., the tool that allows the owner to exclude potential 
infringers.175  In other words, the risk bearer should enjoy the 
copyright, unless we have a strong reason not to allocate the right 
to her.  Thus, the right should be accorded to the party who 
undertakes the costs and the financial risks.176  Had the law 
awarded its prize to a party who did not bear the costs and the risks 
associated with making the work and commercializing it, it would 
not only have failed in its mission to provide incentives for making 
the work, but it would have provided disincentives for so doing.177 
An initial common sense observation is that the typical risk-
bearer in the workplace is the employer.178  This is a broad 
statement, which will be refined later on.  But, beforehand, we 
need to point to the advantages of the employer as a risk bearer, as 
compared to the employee, and realize that the basic bargain of the 
employment relationship between some employers and some 
employees is a shift of risks. 
Most employers have more resources and familiarity with the 
market than their employees.179  The typical employee is risk 
averse and relies on his or her salary for a living.180 The employers 
(and later I will refine this statement and narrow it to employers in 
the content industries) are in the business of marketing their 
products.  The employer has established marketing avenues.  The 
employer invested in the commercialization of the work and bears 
the commercialization risks.181  The employer has better data than 
 
 174 See id. at 327. 
 175 See id. at 327–28. 
 176 Other risks are more difficult to quantify, e.g., a risk to the author’s reputation.  
These are addressed by moral rights, to the extent they are recognized by the law. 
STERLING, supra note 75, at 279–81. See generally Dietz, supra note 71; Rigamonti, 
supra note 71. 
 177 See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 
327–28. 
 178 See Merges, supra note 65, at 16. 
 179 See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 
327. 
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the employee about market behavior and has better experience 
with the market.182  Employees, especially those whose livelihood 
depends upon making works of authorship, are less familiar with 
the market; they work in the creative department rather than in the 
marketing division.  Furthermore, employers (and once again, 
especially those in the content industry) produce and/or market 
many works and thus can cross-subsidize between them by pooling 
the risks together and thereby diluting each separate risk. 183  It 
might be that nine out of ten books will fail in the market, but the 
tenth book will be a best seller, the sales of which will easily cover 
the costs of the nine books.  A publisher who owns all ten books 
can dilute the risk in each book, whereas an employee, had she 
owned only the copyright to her book, would be unable to do so.  
Hence, the author (whether employee or not) is likely to transfer 
the rights to the publisher (whether employer or not). 
The problem, once again, is that when that single book turns to 
be a best seller, then in hindsight, the pre-assignment of the rights 
seems unfair.  Perhaps, one might argue, in such happy occasions, 
the author should be compensated.  A response is found in an 
argument advanced by Landes and Posner, in their influential 
article, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, where they 
treated the author and publisher (though not in the employment 
context) as one unit without observing their sometimes conflicting 
interests, other than a short indirect comment.184  Addressing the 
author-publisher relationship, they noted: “A publisher (say) who 
must share any future speculative gains with the author will pay 
the author less for the work, so the risky component of the author’s 
expected remuneration will increase relative to the certain 
component.”185  In a later work, Landes and Posner addressed the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine directly, arguing, inter alia, that 
paying wages shifts the risk from the employee to the employer.186 
 
 182 See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69. 
 183 See id. 
 184 Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 22, at 327. 
 185 Id. 
 186 LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272. 
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A similar point was made by Robert Merges in the context of 
ownership of employee inventions.187  He noted that the law 
enables pre-assignment contracts between the employers and the 
employees, transferring the rights ex ante.188  Merges explained the 
pre-assignment contract as a trade of risks: “[I]t is arguable that 
current salaries for R&D employees are a precise measure of the 
expected, risk-adjusted present value of all future employee 
inventions.”189  He further points to various internal incentives, 
such as employee reward plans and to a “simple risk analysis.”190  
Merges referred to the employee’s consent to a low-risk award in 
the form of a salary, where the employer undertakes the risk and 
investment associated with the patenting and further development 
of the invention.191 
To summarize, the employer is better situated than the 
employee to market the work more efficiently and bears most of 
the costs associated with marketing it.  The employment 
relationships can be viewed as a shift of risks from the employee to 
the employer.  The question, then, is should the law imitate this 
typical behavior and allocate the initial ownership to the employer? 
B. A Coasean Analysis and Penalty Default Rules 
In a legal environment that celebrates the freedom to contract 
and aims to facilitate a functioning free market, one might ask 
 
 187 See generally Merges, supra note 65.  Merges integrates patent law and employment 
law, via a careful understanding of the complex context of the workplace. See id.  He 
supports the current default rules set by patent law, according to which the employer is 
the owner of the patent.  In comparing copyright law to patent law, one should be aware 
of the differences between the two fields, however.  For these differences, see id. 
 188 Merges, supra note 65, at 8–9.  Merges also explains how the pre-assignment 
contracts preempt the anti-commons problem and the need to gather dispersed property 
rights ex post. Id. at 4, 54.  Thus, the invention exploiters can avoid the asymmetric 
transactions costs. 
 189 Id. at 16.  Merges also discusses team production theory, which points to the 
difficulty in determining the individual contribution of each employee to the final 
product. Id. at 20–23.  This point is acute in the patent field and is equally applicable to 
some modes of creative production in the copyright field, such as in large content 
industries like software companies, Hollywood studios, research institutes issuing public 
reports or law firms composing a legal document. 
 190 Id. at 30–31. 
 191 Id. at 31. 
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whether the initial allocation matters at all, given the parties’ 
ability to contract around it.  An initial allocation which can be 
changed by the parties means that the allocation is only a default 
rule.192  However, changing a default requires information, 
awareness and understanding of the situation and the ability to 
evaluate it.193  Phrased in the economic terms offered by Ronald 
Coase, the question is about the likelihood of a corrective 
transaction.194  Coase famously pointed to transaction costs as a 
factor that might fail corrective transactions.195  Accordingly, 
where transaction costs are not negligible or when there are other 
reasons for which a corrective transaction is unlikely to occur, the 
initial allocation does matter. 
Hence, the question is what should be the default rule of initial 
allocation? Transaction costs might mean that the initial allocation 
is likely to stay.  From an efficiency point of view, we should 
search for a rule that maximizes efficiency.196  According to one 
view, the default rule should imitate the parties’ anticipated 
behavior and thus save negotiation costs.197  The rule should be 
designed according to what the parties would have agreed upon.198  
A second view would opt for the opposite, counter-intuitive default 
rule.  This is the penalty default rule.199 
Discussing contract law, Ayers and Gertner suggested that in 
some situations the default rule should not imitate the parties’ 
anticipated negotiations and be exactly opposite thereto.200 Such 
rules are appropriate when there are information asymmetries 
between the parties.201  The default rule should favor the less-
 
 192 Ayers & Gertner, supra note 28, at 91. 
 193 Id. at 97. 
 194 See Coase, supra note 27, at 15. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Ayers & Gertner, supra note 28, at 97; see also Sunstein, supra note 160, at 123–25. 
 197 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991). 
 198 Id. (writing, in the context of corporate law, that “corporate law should contain terms 
people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every 
contingency sufficiently low”). 
 199 Ayers & Gertner, supra note 28, at 97. 
 200 See id. at 91. 
 201 See id. at 97–99. 
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informed party.202  Thus, if the better informed party wishes to flip 
the default rule, it would have to raise the issue during 
negotiations.203  The result is that the information would be 
revealed and known to both parties.204  The penalty default rule 
thus serves as an informing mechanism.205  Ayers and Gertner 
explained: “Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party 
to the contract an incentive to contract around the default. From an 
efficiency perspective, penalty default rules can be justified as a 
way to encourage the production of information.”206 
Applying the analysis of the Coase theorem and of default rules 
to the employment context indicates that the chances of a 
corrective transaction are asymmetric: employers are more likely 
to change the initial allocation in their favor and employees are 
less likely to be able to do so.207  Thus, although the penalty 
default rule might serve its informative function, this would be of 
no avail to employees.  If the default rule awards the employee the 
initial ownership, the employer would insist that the allocation be 
changed.  Given the superior power of the employer over the 
employee in a market where there is competition among the 
employees over jobs, the default rule would be flipped.  Changing 
the default rule would raise awareness, but the employee would be 
unable to sustain the allocation in her favor or extract any other 
benefits.  If the default rule were the opposite, awarding initial 
ownership to the employer, it would be more likely to stay that 
way.208  Further, in a market where there is competition among 
employers over employees, the latter’s bargaining power might 
suffice to protect their rights and interests.209 
 
 202 Id. at 98. 
 203 See id. at 97–100. 
 204 See id. 
 205 See id. 
 206 Id. at 97. 
 207 For a similar argument, see LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra 
note 145, at 272 (arguing that an allocation to the employee would result in a transfer of 
the rights to the employer). See also LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 123 (2d ed. 2004). 
 208 See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 207, at 123. 
 209 See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 125–27. 
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A 1988 law review article by Professor Hardy provides an 
elaborate economic analysis of copyright in the workplace and 
serves as a convenient baseline for the discussion here.210 
Interestingly, Hardy assumed that the work-made-for-hire doctrine 
does not raise particular difficulties with salaried employees and 
thus focused on freelancers and independent contractors and more 
specifically on the ownership of unforeseen and unbargained for 
uses of the copyrighted work.211  Applying the Coase theorem, 
Hardy noted that in the regular course of events, authors and 
publishers negotiate all the time and hence the transaction costs are 
low.212  He concluded that the initial allocation in these cases does 
not matter from the public’s point of view.213  Focusing on the 
unforeseen uses, he concluded that bargaining over the rights for 
such uses have infinite transaction costs.214  Hardy then explored 
two possible criteria for allocating the rights of these uses.  One is 
the “best exploiter” test: it examines which party is in a better 
position to exploit the work, in terms of resources, experience, and 
market position.215  He evaluated “better exploitation” according to 
what can be understood as a constitutional standard that the works 
should benefit the public, rather than the copyright owner (or 
author).216 
A second possible criterion Hardy discussed is the “cheaper 
estimator”: “who is better placed to estimate the value of 
unforeseen uses”?217  If we accord the rights to this party, it alone 
would profit from the unforeseen uses.218  If we accord the rights 
in the unforeseen uses to the party who could not estimate them 
cheaply, the rule would result in the cheaper estimator raising the 
 
 210 See generally Hardy, supra note 23. 
 211 See id. at 190–92. 
 212 Id. at 191. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 192. 
 216 See id.  Hardy emphasized the public, but did not directly attribute this emphasis to 
the Constitution.  His careful study of numerous cases found that courts followed this 
“better exploiter” rule in most cases. See id. at 199–202. 
 217 Id. at 192–93.  Note that Hardy assumes that known uses are disclosed. Id. at 191 
n.23. 
 218 Id. at 192. 
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issue during negotiations and contracting for any such uses.219  
Accordingly, Hardy concluded that the rights for any unforeseen 
uses should vest with the party who cannot estimate the unforeseen 
uses cheaply.220  Rephrased in terms offered later by Ayers and 
Gertner, Hardy took into account the asymmetric power and 
searched for a mechanism that would solve the information gap.221  
The “cheaper estimator” test can be rephrased as a penalty default 
rule, which forces the more sophisticated party to reveal its 
estimations.222  But Hardy then backed off, noting that this is a 
difficult assessment to make and should be done on a case-by-case 
analysis.223  He thus abandoned this criterion and remained with 
the best exploiter criterion alone.224 
This is a very helpful analysis, but we need to draw its 
contours.  It limits itself to situations where there is no contract, or 
that the contract is silent about some uses of the work, as in the 
case of unforeseen uses.  Foreseeing the unforeseen is indeed an 
impossible task, but as Ruth Towse notes, publishers frequently 
require the author to assign all future rights, including unknown 
uses.225  The publishers simply have more experience and have 
realized more than once that unforeseen uses do occur.226  The 
digitization of every kind of work, which characterized the 1990s, 
provides one example,227 and broadcasting video over mobile 
phones in the 2000s is another.228  In other words, the fact that 
there are unforeseen uses is itself foreseen and can be addressed by 
the parties ex ante.229  Thus, the experienced publisher (or 
 
 219 See id. 
 220 Id. at 195. 
 221 See id. at 192–95. 
 222 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 28, at 91. 
 223 Hardy, supra note 23, at 194. 
 224 Id. at 195. 
 225 RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 17 (2001) [hereinafter TOWSE, 
CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS]. 
 226 See id. 
 227 BENKLER, supra note 36, at 214–15. 
 228 Id. at 404–05. 
 229 Unless the law interferes and prohibits transactions as to future works or future uses, 
as did the German Copyright Act until the 2007 amendment. See supra text 
accompanying note 123. 
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employer), who is usually the cheaper estimator, is likely to raise 
the issue of unforeseen uses during negotiations with the author 
(employee).230  Given the unknown probability of such unforeseen 
uses and their inherent speculative nature, the price the author 
might ask for is likely to be low, if anything. 
Cognitive psychology teaches us that many prefer the concrete, 
solid and positive present value, rather than the probable future 
gain with similar expectancy.231  In the context of creative 
employees, the future gains and their probability are unknown in 
advance.232  Faced with the option of receiving a reasonable 
payment now or a large share of the gains in the future, but under 
an assumption of low probability, most people would prefer the 
former option.233  Adding that we can safely assume that most 
employees are risk-averse and that most employers can more easily 
bear the risk by spreading it over their entire activity, and taking 
into consideration that sharing the gains with the authors is likely 
to reduce the authors’ salary and shift back part of the risk to 
them,234 the practice of requiring that all rights are transferred is 
more efficient and Hardy’s “cheapest estimator” rule collapses.  
Given the unequal bargaining power of the employee and the 
employer, we should not be surprised to see that where a written 
 
 230 See Hardy, supra note 23, at 193–95. 
 231 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox, Weighing Risk and Uncertainty, in 
PREFERENCES, BELIEF AND SIMILARITY: SELECTED WRITINGS 747 (Amos Tversky & Eldar 
Shafir eds., 2003).  There are two preferences: one for the certain rather than the probable 
and one for the present rather than the future. Id.  For example, most of us would rather 
receive $100 than a 20% chance that we would receive $500.  Further, most of us would 
rather receive it now than later. Id.  When the present offer is concrete and certain and the 
future offer is uncertain, it is an easy choice, unless the expected benefit (the probability 
of profits) in the latter case is much higher than the current offer. Id. 
 232 See TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS, supra note 225, at 69–71. 
 233 See discussion of the “certainty effect” and related effects in Paul Slovic, Baruch 
Fischoff & Sara Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 480–81 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in PREFERENCES, BELIEF AND 
SIMILARITY: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 231, at 551, 606–11. 
 234 See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272. 
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contract exists, the employee will transfer all uses, known and 
present as well as unknown and future, to the employer.235 
This analysis instructs us that in some cases, even where there 
are information asymmetries, a penalty default rule would not be 
effective.  Indeed, it might draw the attention of the uninformed 
employee, who will now be informed.  However, information in 
itself is insufficient to be able to change the default rule.236  In an 
employee’s market, i.e., where there is competition among 
employees over jobs, the average employee is unable to shift the 
default rule in his or her favor.237  The result of a penalty default 
rule would be that it would easily be contracted around without a 
penalty to the employer.238  Moreover, the employee would suffer 
demoralization costs.  Learning about a right one has, only to 
realize that it is easily taken away without any ability to affect the 
transfer or without any compensation, might cause loss of trust.  
Such an employee might feel he or she was tricked.  The 
demoralization costs of an easily-contracted-around penalty default 
rule (or better: a non-penalty default rule) can be rephrased as an 
endowment effect, i.e., the bias of property holders as to its 
value.239  Owners tend to value their property at a higher price than 
they themselves would have been willing to pay to buy the same 
property.240  If the default rule accords the employee with the 
copyright subject to the option to change the default rule, and 
given the typical lack of power by the individual employee, the 
 
 235 Once again, the aftermath of Tasini, where newspapers insisted that freelancers 
agree to an “all rights transferred” contract with no further compensation, illustrates this 
point. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.  Hardy’s analysis is also limited in 
that he focused on works that have already been made. See generally Hardy, supra note 
23.  He assumed that the works came into being and discussed the post-creation phase. Id.  
Hence, it is not surprising that his main criterion is the better exploiter of the work. Id. at 
195.  However, the economic view of copyright law taught us that the law needs to 
provide incentives to make works in the first place.  We should query how considering 
the ex ante incentives affect his analysis. 
 236 See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 120–22. 
 237 Id. at 107. 
 238 Id. at 119–20. 
 239 Id. at 112 (discussing the endowment effect in the context of employment). 
 240 Id. 
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allocation would be changed and the employee would feel the 
greater loss caused by the endowment effect.241 
This kind of cost does not in itself dictate that the law avoids 
such allocations.  Such a conclusion would amount to endorsing 
some form of imposed ignorance, which I do not support. The 
argument is that there is no point in devising rules that will fail to 
achieve their stated purpose, and in addition, cause unnecessary 
demoralization.  Thus, a penalty default rule awarding initial 
ownership to the employee would have the unnecessary costs of 
the corrective transactions and additional demoralization costs.242  
The information deficiencies should be taken care of, but not by a 
penalty default rule.243 
The interim conclusion is that allocating the initial rights to the 
employee is likely to be corrected immediately by the employer at 
almost no cost, but a contrary allocation is likely to stay.  The 
author/employee is compensated by receiving a steady salary and 
ridding herself from the risks associated with making and 
commercializing the work, as well as enforcing the rights.244  This 
conclusion will be subject to an inspection under employment law, 
but beforehand, we need to fine-tune the general statement made 
earlier, that the employer is the best risk-bearer.245 
C. Typical Cases 
A general rule based on typical cases is more efficient than a 
case-by-case rule as it enhances foreseeability, but given that there 
are various kinds of transaction costs that might fail efficient 
corrective transactions, I believe it is better to calibrate the scales 
and zoom-in into the workplace, in order to differentiate between 
various kinds of situations.  This will enable us to fine-tune the 
general allocation rule.246  Accordingly, we should ask the 
following question: in the workplace, who is the party that 
 
 241 See id. at 126. 
 242 Id. at 126–27. 
 243 See infra Part III.C. 
 244 Merges, supra note 65, at 16. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Of course, defining sub-categories has some costs of its own, as parties are likely to 
disagree as to the applicable category, a dispute resulting in uncertainty and further costs. 
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typically undertakes the risks associated with creating the 
copyrighted work?  Three criteria lend themselves to this 
discussion: the kind of work, the kind of employer, and the kind of 
employee.  I discuss them briefly and then turn to the scope 
element of the work-made-for-hire doctrine to evaluate it on the 
background of this discussion. 
1. The Work 
Some products require pooling together several works of 
different authors.  A movie combines a literary work (the script), 
musical works, photography, acting, directing, and many other 
works.  Landes and Posner noted that it is efficient to vest 
copyright of an integrated expressive work in the hands of one 
person so to avoid multiple ownerships.247  Parisi and Ševčenko 
elaborated on this point and argued that creative works are often 
the result of many people each contributing a piece of the work, 
which needs to be assembled together.248  Complex software is an 
example.  In order to be able to commercialize the aggregated 
work, the bits and bytes need to be accumulated.  The various 
authors can attempt to negotiate a joint venture, but given the well-
known problems of common action such as negotiation costs and 
hold-outs, the split of rights is likely to result in an anti-commons 
problem and nothing at all but frustration.249 Allocating the rights 
to one entity in the first place is far more efficient than pooling 
them together later.250  Thus, in the case of integrated expressive 
 
 247 LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272.  For the 
perils of multiple ownerships, see generally Heller, supra note 62. 
 248 Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 303; see also Merges, supra note 65, at 20–23 
(discussing “team production theory” in the context of patent law). 
 249 See Heller, supra note 62, at 677–78.  A shared ideology can provide a powerful 
motivation to overcome the common-action problem.  For example, the Open Source 
movement provides numerous illustrations of joint ventures, where those who participate 
forego any veto rights they might have had, thus mitigating the anti-commons problem.  
For a discussion of the process in which open source software is achieved, see R. VAN 
WENDEL DE JOODE ET AL., PROTECTING THE VIRTUAL COMMONS—SELF ORGANIZING 
OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE COMMUNITIES AND INNOVATIVE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES 13–23 (2003) (describing models of open source and the way to 
coordinate distributed ownership). 
 250 Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 21, at 303. 
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works, to use Landes and Posner’s term,251 there is yet another 
reason to allocate the rights to the employer. 
2. The Employer 
The employer’s business model matters.  We should 
differentiate a content business from a non-content business.  In 
workplaces such as a music label, a Hollywood studio, a software 
company or a publishing house, the employer is in a better position 
to undertake the risks associated with producing and 
commercializing the work, since the typical production firm does 
not invest in one work only, but simultaneously, in several 
works.252  This enables an employer to spread the risk over the 
several works and cross-subsidize them.  The employer whose 
incentive is to market such works has better familiarity with the 
market and its workings.  Thus, the employer is in a better position 
to market the work efficiently and successfully. 
In a non-content industry, where the employee is hired to do a 
non-creative (in the copyright sense) job, but nevertheless makes a 
work of authorship, the employer is not usually involved in the risk 
taken in making the work, nor does the employer have unique 
knowledge about the market of the unexpected work.253  In such 
cases, there is no ex ante reason to allocate the copyright to the 
employer. 
3. The Employee 
As the previous criterion illustrates, some employees are hired 
to make a creative work, such as an architect hired to work in an 
architecture firm, a doll designer, or a musician hired to compose 
music for an advertising firm.  Some employees are not hired to 
make creative works, whether they work for a content industry or 
not: a secretary, a laboratory supervisor, or a recruitment officer.  
These employees might nevertheless make works of authorship, 
 
 251 LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272. 
 252 Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, supra note 26, at 404–05 (noting 
that the film industry played a significant role in the creation of the work-for-hire 
doctrine). 
 253 See, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems. Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992). 
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perhaps to the pleasant surprise of all.  In some cases, these works 
might turn out to be profitable.  A lecture prepared by an employee 
can be published and sold to a publisher, a guide written for 
internal purposes can turn out to be useful to other firms, software 
written to improve office work might be commercialized.  In such 
cases, we are unlikely to find pre-assignment contracts, and neither 
side is especially suited to market the work, so it is unclear ex ante 
who is the best risk-bearer.  Given that the work was created after 
the commencement of the employment relationship, the likelihood 
of a corrective transaction is minimized.254  The parties might 
decide to engage in a joint venture and will then formalize their 
relationship regarding the work.255 
4. The Scope of Employment 
Under the second element of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, 
a court (or the parties themselves) should decide whether the work 
was made within the scope of employment.256 Recall that courts 
apply a three part test borrowed from agency law, examining 
whether the work is “of the kind [the employee] was employed to 
perform,” whether the work was made “within the authorized time 
and space limits,” and whether it was made with the purpose that it 
serves the employer’s interests.257 
The first test (kind of work) requires that we ask the question 
just proposed: what was the employee hired to do? Assessing 
whether the employee was hired to make creative works requires 
that we interpret the employment contract, whether written or oral, 
and take into account the dynamic nature of such contracts.258 
The second test (time and space) is rather objective, but is 
irrelevant to many new forms of employment,259 and in any case, 
 
 254 See supra Part II.B. 
 255 See Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, supra note 26, at 407–10. 
 256 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989). 
 257 Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Avtec Sys., 
Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 94-2364, 1995 WL 541610, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995). 
 258 Guy Mundlak, Generic or Sui-Generis Law of Employment Contracts?, 16 INT’L J. 
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 309, 319 (2000). 
 259 Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129.  Thus, for example, a court found that a research 
fellow works either in the employer’s institution or elsewhere, e.g., in the library. See 
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can be easily bypassed by an employee who wishes to distance the 
employer from the (later to be disputed) work.260  In a world of 
changing working conditions, with ubiquitous computing and 
universal communication access, the physical place and the time of 
the making of the work are obsolete factors.261  Whether the work 
was created during the duration of employment remains relevant, 
but is more of an indicator as to the first element of the work-
made-for-hire doctrine, i.e., whether the author was an employee at 
all. 
The third test (purpose) is difficult to evaluate and would often 
require evidence and testimonies, thus rendering it unpredictable in 
many cases and expensive (and risky) to find out.262  Some courts 
seem to transform the rather subjective inquiry of the employee’s 
purpose to a more objective inquiry about the connection between 
the work and the employment.263  To the extent that this test is so 
interpreted, it is no more than another facet of the first test: while 
the first test compares the general tasks of the employee and his or 
her actual activity in making the disputed work, the third test asks 
about the fit between the employer’s activity and the specific 
work.264 
Following the analysis offered here, the better question should 
be the following: which party undertook, or is better situated to 
undertake, the risks associated with making the work and 
commercializing it? The first test, asking whether the employee 
was hired to make creative works like the work at stake, is thus the 
most important of the three agency tests, while the second should 
 
Genzmer v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1282 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002).  A more decisive factor was that the work at stake in that dispute—a computer 
program—was made while the research fellow was an employee. Id. at 1282. 
 260 Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129. 
 261 See Genzmer, F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82. 
 262 Indeed, courts seem to struggle with this test. See Avtec, 1995 WL 541610, at *5.  
Kreiss pointed to the subjective nature of the third test. Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129. 
 263 See, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems. Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (D.S.C. 1992) (“[The] 
ultimate purpose of the development of the [work] was to benefit [employer] by 
maximizing the efficiency of the operation of the quality control lab.”). 
 264 Kreiss, supra note 96, at 129 (proposing that when the first two tests are met, there 
is a presumption that the employee acted by a desire to serve the employer). 
C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:47:12 AM 
2009] WHO OWNS BRATZ? 143 
no longer be an indication for this purpose, and the third is at most, 
an indication of the first test. 
Miller v. CP Chemicals, Inc.265 provides a helpful 
illustration.266  As mentioned above, Miller, a former employee, 
argued that he owned the copyright in a computer program he 
developed while employed at CP Chemicals.267  Miller was the 
laboratory’s supervisor, a job that included computerization of 
analytical data generated in the lab.268  Miller became concerned 
about the efficiency of manual calculations in the quality control of 
one of the products.269  He then wrote a computer program to assist 
in the matter.270  The development was done at home on his own 
time without further payment.271  CP managers knew about the 
program and requested Miller to write further programs for other 
products, which he did.272  After the employment was terminated, 
the parties disputed the ownership of the first program.273 
Following Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 
(CCNV),274 the court applied agency tests to determine the scope of 
Miller’s employment.275  On the first test, the court found that “the 
development of the computer program was at least incidental to his 
job responsibilities,” despite the fact the job description did not 
mention computer programming.276  On the second test, the court 
found that the work was done during the time period of 
employment, though from the home, on Miller’s time and with no 
additional pay.277  The third test was decisive.  The court found a 
fit between the disputed work (the computer program) and the 
 
265  808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).  
 266 See also King v. SA Weather Service 2008 (143) SCA (S. Afr.). 
 267 Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1239. 
 268 Id. at 1240. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. at 1240–41. 
274  490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 275 Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. 
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employer’s interests, in that it was “directly related to a specific 
product . . . for the primary benefit of the employer.”278 
This reasoning fails to take into account both copyright law and 
employment law perspectives.  The risk that the time and effort 
invested in the making of the work might turn out to be a waste, 
was borne solely by the employee.  Had the program not 
succeeded, Miller would have borne the costs.  The costs and the 
risks at stake are those associated with the making of the work and 
with utilizing it.  The fact that the work was product-specific and 
hence less likely to be commercialized is less relevant.  Consider, 
for example, an independent contractor who approaches a firm, 
saying that she has studied its business and thinks it can improve 
its production by applying a device (or software) she designed for 
its particular use.  The risk is borne only by her: if she fails to sell, 
she will be left with a useless product.  In other words, the Miller 
court made too much of the fit between the software and the 
employer’s business.  The focus should have remained on the fit 
between the job description, interpreted in a pro-employee manner 
as discussed in the next part, and the actual work done, asking 
about the location and placement of the risks.279  Awarding the 
copyright to the employer in this context lessens the incentives of 
the employees to think outside the box, initiate new tools and 
develop software that benefits all. 
* * * 
To summarize, under a copyright law perspective, the initial 
allocation of copyright should correspond to the risks taken in 
producing the work in the first place and in commercializing it 
later on.280  In designing allocation rules, the legislature or the 
courts should consider the uneven chances of a corrective 
transaction.  The typical situation is that the employer is the best 
risk-bearer.281  Nevertheless, instead of one scenario, the law 
 
 278 Id. at 1244 n.7. 
 279 The court was aware that a contract could have solved the uncertainty, but failed to 
take into account the unequal bargaining power of the employee vis-à-vis the employer.  
The court admitted that the work-made-for-hire doctrine might create harsh results, but 
placed the burden on the employee to obtain a written agreement. Id. at 1245. 
 280 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 281 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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should address several typical situations and shape legal categories 
accordingly.  The kind of work, the business model of the 
employer, and the kind of employee are all factors to be 
considered.282  A penalty default rule may convey information but 
it will be ineffective and cause other unnecessary costs.283  The 
information gaps should be addressed in a different manner. 
This analysis supports the second element in the work-made-
for-hire doctrine, i.e., whether the work was created within the 
scope of the employment, with a proposal to interpret it with an 
emphasis on the question of risk, instead of the current three-prong 
test borrowed from agency law.284  A second leg of the allocation 
rule looks not only at the work at stake and the risk bearer, but at 
the relationship between the parties, and this is where employment 
law enters. 
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Thus far, we have discussed the question of ownership of 
works created by employees from a copyright law perspective 
under its economic conception.  Courts supplement copyright law 
with tests borrowed from agency law, which in turn derives from 
tort law.285  Relationships between a hiring party and a hired party, 
whether employees or not, might also be subject to principles of 
contract law.286  The absence of employment law within this legal 
construction is striking.  This part suggests that we insert and 
integrate principles of employment law into the copyright law 
analysis.  The integration is important in the particular case but it 
also serves a broader argument, that copyright law should not be 
isolated from other legal fields. 
This part first presents the dilemma arising from the legal 
setting and briefly draws the contours of the discussion by 
explaining the methodology undertaken here (Part III.A).  Second, 
 
 282 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 283 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 284 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 285 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740–41 (1989). See 
generally Jacob, supra note 16. 
 286 See Burnham, supra note 63, at 400; Mundlak, supra note 258, at 319. 
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this part unpacks the notion of unfairness in the employment 
context (Part III.B) and then discusses concrete legal mechanisms 
that correspond to the unpacked meaning of fairness (Part III.C). 
A. Setting the Stage 
1. Fairness and Efficiency 
Instincts of justice (and more often, of injustice) often tilt us 
towards the weaker party in a legal conflict.  We wish to assist the 
poor in their struggle with the rich or the citizen struggling to find 
his way through the corridors of the bureaucratic state.  We wish to 
lend a supporting hand to the person in need.  However, while 
these are just instincts, they are perhaps not shared by all.  Instincts 
are a good reason to question and revisit current norms, deliberate 
and think of improvements to the existing order, but they are 
insufficient grounds in themselves for legal reasoning.  Instincts 
cannot substitute rational logic, though the latter can and should 
reflect considerations of justice, even of compassion.  The question 
of initial ownership reflects a tension between instincts of justice 
or fairness and efficiency.287  This is not to say that efficiency is by 
nature unjust, or that justice and fairness are by nature inefficient.  
However, in the context of the discussion here, the efficient 
solution in many cases is to award ownership to the employer, an 
allocation which at first sight might not seem fair to many 
observers.  Here, I try to breakdown this intuitive dichotomy, show 
its complexity and fine-tune the legal rules accordingly. 
The unfairness instincts play an active role in both the 
popular288 and legislative forums.289  These instincts arise when the 
employer earns much from a work made by the employee while 
 
 287 See Guy Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 311, 
313–14 (2007) [hereinafter Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law]. 
 288 See, e.g., Courtney Love, Remarks at the Digital Hollywood Online Entertainment 
Conference (June 14, 2000), available at  http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/ 
06/14/love/ (criticizing the record industry’s pressure to include sound recordings in the 
“work for hire” doctrine in the U.S.). 
 289 See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 23, at 183–85 (discussing testimonies before Congress 
while it debated the 1976 Copyright Act). 
C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:47:12 AM 
2009] WHO OWNS BRATZ? 147 
the employee does not share the gains.290  Bluntly speaking, the 
(un)fairness instinct is that the employer rips off the weak 
employee’s creative works and the revenues.  It is especially acute 
in situations where there are “unbargained for or unforeseen uses, 
[in which] one party will gain what the other loses,”291 i.e., when 
“unforeseen uses . . . bring windfall profits to the hiring party,”292 
or put differently, “an ex ante ‘fair’ bargain can turn into an ex post 
rip-off.”293  The complaint about unfairness can be read as a 
merger of two narratives—that of the romantic author prevalent in 
copyright law294 with that of the exploited, weak employee, in 
employment law.295  Of course, “weak” and “powerful” are 
relative and fuzzy terms.  Is the employee so weak vis-à-vis the 
employer?  Is the unfairness instinct valid?  If so, how should the 
law account for it? 
The tension appears in the legal layer of the allocation 
spectrum, discussed above.296  The American model seems at first 
sight to prefer efficiency to fairness,297 whereas the German model 
seems at first sight to focus almost entirely on the author and prefer 
fairness to efficiency.298  While the tension between 
justice/fairness instincts and efficiency surfaces within each model, 
the focus here is on the American model.  Both elements of the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine reflect the conflict between efficiency 
and fairness.  A broad interpretation of the scope element, i.e., a 
low threshold that easily recognizes works as made within the 
scope of employment, supports the employers, whereas a narrower 
interpretation would support the employees.  Part II addressed the 
 
 290 See Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, supra note 287, at 312 (“The 
right of the employer to issue commands and make unilateral decisions with regard to the 
workplace confers significant powers, which can sometimes be abused.”). 
 291 See Hardy, supra note 23, at 185. 
 292 Id. at 190. 
 293 TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARDS, supra note 225, at 17 (emphasis 
added). 
 294 See Jaszi, supra note 41, at 456; Woodmansee, supra note 41, at 425.  Others doubt 
the influence of the romantic author on the law. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic 
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 882–88 (1997). 
 295 See Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, supra note 287, at 312. 
 296 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 297 See supra Part I.C.1. 
 298 See discussion supra Part I.C.4. 
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efficiency side in this tension.  Now we need to unpack the 
“fairness” part of this juxtaposition. Beforehand, a short 
methodological comment is due. 
2. Methodology 
Studying the intersection of two separate legal fields can be 
conducted in several ways. One is doctrinal and searches for a 
rather technical way to coordinate between the two bodies of law 
so to minimize friction in their application.  A second, deeper level 
of inquiry, asks whether the two fields are compatible, by turning 
to the underlying theories of each.  The second track requires that 
we first explore each field of law separately and then examine the 
match of the principles, rather than examining the rules which are 
supposed to execute the principles.299  The theoretical inquiry is 
complicated when each body of law has several underlying 
theories, which might not be in harmony. 
Several theories explain copyright law, ranging from an 
instrumental conception under which copyright is a means to serve 
the public,300 to a competing conception, which views copyright as 
a means to serve the authors’ proprietary rights.301  Employment 
law as well can be read under several views, emphasizing equity 
(fairness) or efficiency and various attempts to reconcile the 
two.302  Thus, in examining the relationship between copyright law 
and employment law, we can either map all possible theories of 
each field of law and inquire all possible pairs of the theories’ 
interrelationships, or, choose in advance our preferable theory of 
each field.  Here I undertake the latter approach and juxtapose 
copyright law under its economic theory, with employment law, 
under its fairness conception. 
 
 299 For an application of the second, theoretical track, in the context of the relationship 
between copyright law and free speech jurisprudence, see Michael D. Birnhack, More or 
Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN—
IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 59, 85 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
 300 See STERLING, supra note 75, at 58. 
 301 For theories of copyright law, see Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual 
Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 38 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296 (1988). 
 302 See Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, supra note 287, at 313–14. 
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This pair of rival principles chosen for examination is probably 
the most intriguing one, as the principles on the table are efficiency 
and fairness.  In this sense, I believe the gap between copyright law 
and employment law is much wider than had we examined 
copyright law under a non-utilitarian, droit d’auteur view and 
compared it with employment law, with a fairness-reading in mind.  
The latter view informs German law, discussed above, which 
strives to protect the individual author/employee more than the 
hiring party.303  Equally, had we examined copyright law under a 
strict economic reading and treated the employment relationship as 
a labor market, similar to other free markets, there would not be 
much of a conflict (and authors/employees would not fare very 
well). 
B. Fairness in Employment 
This section unpacks the meaning of fairness in the context of 
an employee’s copyrighted works.  The discussion identifies 
information deficiencies and external factors as causes of 
unfairness, but then examines the employment relationship as a 
shift of risks. 
1. Fairness 
Fairness is a moral principle that in itself does not say much.  
Often, fairness is an ex post conclusion or observation, but does 
not include ex ante guidance.  In order to render this principle 
helpful, we need to unpack the meaning of fairness in the 
employment context, a rather daunting task.  I will narrow down 
the task to ownership in works made in the workplace context. 
What does fairness mean in the context of employment law? 
The crux of the fairness argument is a well-known lesson of 
employment law, that the employer and the employee have 
unequal bargaining power.304  The employee is often much weaker 
 
 303 See discussion supra Part I.C.4. 
 304 Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 138; 
see Hugh Collins, Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment 
Relation, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 3, 10–11 (Hugh Collins, 
Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds., 2000). 
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than the employer.305  Absent legal rules or social norms to limit 
the employer’s power, the employer could exploit the employee 
and mistreat him or her.  The ultimate power to fire the employee 
would loom in the background of the employment relationship but 
at the forefront of the employee’s concerns. 
However, much like “fairness,” unequal bargaining power is a 
description of a particular employment context or even of general 
modes of employment, but it is not instructive in itself.306  Finding 
that there is unequal bargaining power is too general an 
observation and only directs us to search for ways to correct the 
inequality.  Hence, this much-used term, too, needs to be 
unpacked.  Of course, some argue that there is no inherent 
unfairness in the employment context and that it is just a matter of 
demand and supply.307  However, even those who hold such a 
market-based view would agree that market failures should be 
identified and corrected.308 
Several scholars attempted to do exactly this.  Hugh Collins, 
for example, pointed to three main reasons for market failures, 
which in turn justify regulation of the employment relationship: 
inadequate information, the use of monopoly power in the market, 
and high transaction costs.309  Guy Davidov suggests that 
inequality of bargaining power exists when market failures enable 
 
 305 See Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 
138–39. 
 306 Id. at 140 (noting that this concept “suffers from inherent vagueness”). 
 307 Id. at 139. 
 308 For a justification of employment law as a social means to correct market failures, 
see Alan Hyde, What is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: 
GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille 
eds., 2006).  Hyde argues that 
[l]abour and employment law is the collection of regulatory 
techniques and values that are properly applied to any market that, if 
left unregulated, will reach socially sub-optimal outcomes because 
economic actors are individuated and cannot overcome collective 
action problems . . . .  On this view, labour law is not the set, in 
theory infinite, of human values that might rationally be imposed by 
societies on markets.  Rather, labour law is the much narrower set of 
values that correct market failures through particular legal 
techniques. 
Id. at 53–54. 
 309 See Collins, supra note 304, at 7–11. 
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the employer to influence the terms of the contract more than the 
employee can.310  Put differently, various failures of the 
employment market are often conceived and rephrased as unequal 
bargaining power. 
These failures can be grouped into factors internal to the 
relationship between the employer and employee and those 
external to the particular relationship, which the parties cannot 
control but may use or abuse within the relationship.  The first 
group includes information deficiencies of various kinds, bounded 
rationality and lock-in costs.311  The second group includes market 
conditions, such as the level of unemployment and whether the 
employer enjoys a monopolistic status.312 
2. Information Deficiencies 
Information deficiencies play a crucial role: without knowledge 
about the rule of allocation of the copyright work, one cannot plan 
his or her steps and is unlikely to raise the issue of ownership in 
negotiations, and in fact, the entire incentives-talk of copyright law 
becomes shallow and empty. How many authors are familiar with 
copyright law principles, i.e., which works are protected and which 
are not?  How would an author respond to the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine, had she known about it?  Perhaps she would prefer to 
remain an independent contractor, or, if she is an employee, she 
would try to “work around” the doctrine and make the work 
outside the scope of employment, or perhaps discuss the issue with 
the employer before engaging in the costly making of the work.  
Information about the law, about the status of the author as an 
employee and about the circumstances of making the work—is 
crucial. 
Unlike the employee, the employer usually is more 
knowledgeable about copyright law, especially an employer in the 
content industry.313  There is an asymmetry of information between 
the parties.314  Dealing with copyright law might be central to the 
 
 310 Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 139. 
 311 See id. 
 312 See id. 
 313 See Collins, supra note 304, at 7–8. 
 314 Id. at 8. 
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employer’s business, but even if this is not the case, the employer 
typically enjoys ongoing legal services. The employer in the 
content business is a repeat player and has better (institutional) 
memory than the hired, creative party.315 
On the other hand, the employee has better knowledge 
regarding his or her ability to perform the expected job and make 
the works which he or she was hired to make.316  The employee 
usually knows, or at least knows better than the new employer, her 
abilities, how she manages her time, works under pressure, and the 
like circumstances.  The employer also bears related costs, such as 
monitoring the employees once hired, and is subject to employees’ 
strategic behavior.317 
However, the dual asymmetries do not negate each other.  The 
employer has some information about the employee’s abilities, 
based on prior works, recommendations, and the employer’s 
experience in hiring new employees.318  In as much as ownership is 
concerned, the employer is on the stronger side of this asymmetry 
of information, and in the typical case, is in a better position to 
plan and affect ownership.319  When the employee has experience 
in similar dealings, though, he or she is likely to raise the issue of 
ownership and place it on the negotiations table, and will not 
automatically accept the allocation offered by the employer.320 
Bounded rationality, i.e., various factors which cause human 
decision making to be imperfect and not fully rational, further 
enhance the inferiority of the employee vis-à-vis the employer.321  
The employer is better positioned to assess the likelihood of 
success of the work in the market and can more easily survey and 
 
 315 See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69–71. 
 316 See Collins, supra note 304, at 8 (pointing out, in the general context of 
employment, a dual informational asymmetry about the quality of the proposed 
employment relationship). 
 317 See Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Labour Law and Economic Theory: A 
Reappraisal, in LEGAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT RELATION 29, 43 (Hugh Collins, 
Paul Davies, Roger Rideout eds., 2000). 
 318 See Collins, supra note 304, at 7. 
 319 See  Collins, supra note 304, at 7–8. See generally Merges, supra note 65, at 12. 
 320 See Merges, supra note 65, at 14. 
 321 See Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 
139. 
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study the market to assess whether there is, or is expected to be, 
competition.322  The employer also has better access to marketing 
channels and more resources to market the work.  Employees, on 
the other hand (and this is an admitted gross generalization) are 
less informed about market conditions and marketing channels but 
nevertheless tend to overestimate the potential commercial success 
of the work.323  Reality is often harsh.  Add to this optimism bias 
the instincts of ownership (I made it, it’s mine!), and the 
endowment effect is in play.324 
The interim conclusion is that the employee is disadvantaged 
vis-à-vis the employer. 
3. External Factors 
External factors lend further power to the employer at the 
expense of the employee.  A young musician is thrilled to be 
offered “a contract” to produce a record; an author is tremendously 
excited about a publisher’s offer to publish a book; and an 
academic is interested in publication, not necessarily in the money 
and ownership of the work, but rather in the fact of publication 
itself, else (academic) perishing might be real.  While the 
musician, author, and academic are often freelancers rather than 
employees, the analysis is similar in the case of those authors who 
opt for an employment relation rather than remaining independent 
contractors.  When the employer’s interests are commercial and the 
employee’s interests are more personal and less commercial, this 
divergence of interests is likely to reflect itself in a reduced interest 
in the issue of ownership on the employee’s side. 
In some cases, the employment market and the strength of the 
particular employer in the market create an ex ante power 
advantage to the employer: if 86% of the U.S. music market is in 
the hands of the “big four” labels,325 then a junior musician does 
 
 322 See Towse, Copyright Policy, supra note 45, at 69. 
 323 Id. at 69, 71. 
 324 See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 112. 
 325 Patrick Burkart, Loose Integration in the Popular Music Industry, 28 POPULAR 
MUSIC & SOC’Y 489 (2005).  This figure is dated to 2005, and the “big four” refers to 
Universal Music Group (UMG), Sony-Bertelsmann Music Group (Sony-BMG), Electric 
and Musical Industries (EMI), and Warner Music Group (WMG). See id. 
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not have much choice.326  Going “indie” (independent) is a costly, 
risky avenue.327  While superstars are not powerless and perhaps 
even more powerful than the industry player, they are, by 
definition, very few.  The vast majority of authors seem, at first 
sight, to be trapped in an unpleasant situation. 
4. Trading Risks 
An intermediate conclusion would be rather dim: authors are 
powerless, and alternative routes are few.  However, we should 
take into account not only the point of view of the author, but 
rather zoom-out and examine the deal between the employee-
author and the employer as a whole.  Presenting the deal as a rip-
off ignores the transfer of risks between the parties. 
The discussion here merges with the previous discussion of 
risks in the workplace, conducted under a copyright prism.328  In 
most cases, the employment relationship reflects a trade-off of 
risks and benefits between the parties.329  The employee is hired to 
create works.  She provides her time and work power in exchange 
for security.330  The risk-averse author who lacks the knowledge, 
funds, or will to run her own business would turn to the salaried 
employment option.331  Her option to do so is dependent, of course, 
on the availability of an employer who is willing to hire employees 
rather than to commission an independent contractor, assuming 
that the market of employees is competitive and that the employee 
 
 326 Id. (discussing the market share of the majors and arguing that the music industry 
operates as a rent-seeking cartel and noting that the independent music industry accounts 
for only 14% of U.S. music sales and the “big four” controls the rest of the market 
(86%)). 
 327 Technology enables young artists direct publication avenues, such as by uploading 
their music to P2P sharing programs, a personal website, or a social network. 
 328 See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 329 See Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe, Labour Contracts, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 541, 550 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“At the heart 
of the principal-agent problem lies the inevitable trade-off between the provision of 
incentives to work hard and the sharing of risks.”). 
 330 Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 143 
n.34. 
 331 See Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 548. 
C02_BIRNHACK_ARTICLE_123009_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2009  10:47:12 AM 
2009] WHO OWNS BRATZ? 155 
has several potential employers to choose from.332  The author 
would receive a stable salary and other benefits such as pension 
and paid vacations; he or she also would not be subject to various 
risks associated with making the work and commercializing it or 
risks such as liability for torts (assuming that the vicarious liability 
doctrine applies).333  The author would also not need to engage in 
managing the business, searching for clients, dealing with 
regulators, etc. 
These benefits do not come without a price.  The author loses 
ownership.334  She needs to follow the instructions of her employer 
and is limited in her artistic and creative freedom, at least in the 
workplace.335  The alternative is undertaking the costs of 
expression and the risk herself.  When these risks are too high, the 
alternative is not engaging in any creative work at all. 
* * * 
Viewing the employment relationship in the content business 
as a trade of risks is attractive, as it coincides with the copyright 
analysis.  However, the information deficiencies and external 
factors are not obliterated just because there is a deal and a contract 
between the parties.  We need to search for responses to the 
difficulties discussed here. 
C. Responding to Inequality 
The legal solutions we need to search for should fit as much as 
possible both our conception of copyright law under the incentives 
theory and our conception of employment law as fairness. 
Operating within a general free-market paradigm and having 
pointed to some of the market’s deficiencies, we need to address 
them.  This sub-section points to two possible non-exclusive 
 
 332 Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, supra note 30, at 138–
40. 
 333 Id. 
 334 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also Fisk, Authors at Work, supra note 42, at 56–59 
(discussing the difficulty of reconciling corporate ownership and individual artistic 
expression). 
 335 This is similar to the situation of the independent contractor who needs to follow the 
instructions of the commissioner of her work, but has the choice not to take the job in the 
first place. 
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mechanisms.  First, informed consent narrows the claim of 
unfairness regarding ownership of copyrighted works made in the 
workplace.  Explicit contracts and job descriptions are tools to 
address such deficiencies, accompanied with appropriate 
interpretative instructions.  These mechanisms solve the problem 
that penalty default rules wish to address, without changing the 
initial allocation.  Second, mechanisms of group negotiations 
might ease our instincts of unfairness. 
1. Informed Consent 
Information about the commercial-legal options and ownership 
of copyright can reduce much of the initial observation of 
unfairness.  If an author understands her options, roughly being (1) 
establishing her own business, undertaking the risks, and 
maintaining ownership; (2) providing a work as an independent 
contractor, without transferring the rights but allowing for a license 
to use the work in agreed-upon circumstances, and thus shifting 
only some of the risks; or (3) shifting the entire risk to the hiring 
party, in exchange for a risk-free salary and giving up ownership, 
then she can better decide which avenue to choose. With more 
information, surprises might be minimized and the author might be 
able to leverage the elements she gives up or retains (risk, 
ownership, management hassle) to receive better terms (payment, 
internal incentives like a bonus, control over uses of the work). 
How can informed consent be achieved?  One kind of 
information-enhancing tools lies in the market itself.  The factors 
mentioned in Part II—the work at stake, the kind of employer, and 
the kind of employee336—are useful here too.  These factors create 
a matrix of options.337  The more creative the work is (a 
photograph, painting, musical work), the more we can classify the 
employer as being in the content/cultural industry, and the more 
the author conceives of herself as a creative author, the more the 
situation creates awareness of all parties.  The circumstances of the 
employment themselves convey a clear message to all parties 
 
 336 See supra discussion Part II. 
 337 In each parameter it is better to think of a spectrum of options rather than a binary 
form, hence I resist the temptation to add a table which offers only binary options. 
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involved, that the creative author was hired to make creative works 
which will be sold or used by the employer.  Hence, ownership lies 
with the employer.  Thus, when a doll producer firm offers a 
designer a job as a doll designer, the issue of ownership is not, or 
rather should not, be a surprise.  This is the “Bryant” case.338 
The digitization of many kinds of works that began in the 
1990s teaches us, authors included, that old works do have a 
potential for new commercial uses.  For example, a song written 
for one purpose can later serve as a ring-tone on a cellular phone or 
for a television advertisement.  None of this is a secret.  This is the 
Tasini case.339 
On the other hand, when an employee who does not perceive 
himself as a creative author works in a non-creative industry, 
performs a routine task, and then creates a work of authorship 
there, e.g., a computer program worthy of commercialization, then 
we could say that the circumstance does not provide clear 
indications as to ownership.340  This is the “Miller” case.341 
In other words, the circumstances of employment themselves 
serve as a rather strong signal about the importance of ownership. 
The latter discussion indicates that the temporal dimension is 
crucial here.  Information that is gained after the employment 
contract was struck is not of much use.  Hence, the focus should be 
on ex ante consent, and more specifically, informed consent. 
There are further mechanisms to inform the parties of their 
rights.  A written contract is an obvious mechanism to clarify the 
two sides of the deal, now shaped as an ongoing employment 
relationship.  However, contracts are often incomprehensible or 
indeterminate and require ex post interpretation.  Moreover, 
employment contracts are dynamic and change in the course of 
employment.342  Changes in the patterns of employment do occur 
in the course of employment, even if they do not find an explicit 
 
 338 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 339 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 340 See supra notes 266–79 and accompanying text. 
 341 See Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (D.S.C. 1992). 
 342 See Mundlak, supra note 258, at 313; see also Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 
552. 
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anchoring in a written document.343  A written contract in long-
term employments is inherently incomplete, because it does not 
address every single possible event that might occur during the 
relationship.344  Repeat actions which are not objected to by the 
other party become part of the contract.345  Thus, initial 
information and consent might change; they might be blurred or 
diluted and no longer serve the informing function. 
The employer, knowing that current doctrine operates in his or 
her favor (if, under agency law, the author is an employee and the 
work was made within the scope of the employment relationship), 
might not be meticulous in authoring the contract, perhaps 
deliberately so.  Thus, the informing function of the contract is 
likely to be lost. 
One possible solution would be a penalty default rule, but for 
reasons discussed above, it is likely to be counter-productive.346  
The dynamic nature of employment contracts is yet another reason 
why penalty default rules are ineffective in their intended purpose 
of informing the weaker party of the stakes.  Setting an initial 
allocation rule is a singular event, whereas the circumstances of the 
employment might change this allocation later on, without a 
ceremonial event.  Accordingly a statutory allocation to either side 
is likely to become irrelevant shortly after employment 
commences.  A second solution to the information deficiencies 
would be for courts to adopt an interpretive rule, under which 
vague terms and other interpretive doubts operate in favor of the 
employee.  Such an interpretive rule would provide an incentive to 
the employers to be more precise in the contracts they author. 
Another carrier of information is the job description, which is 
relevant in deciding the second (“scope”) element of the work-
made-for-hire doctrine.347  Instead of turning to the rather vague 
triple test borrowed from agency law,348 a job description may 
provide a clearer point of reference: if the work made by the 
 
 343 See Mundlak, supra note 258, at 313. 
 344 See Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 552. 
 345 Id. 
 346 See supra Part II.B. 
 347 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 348 See supra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
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employee falls within the listed tasks, then it is safe to determine 
that it was made within the scope of employment, and if it does not 
fall within the description, then the author remains the owner.  Job 
descriptions are not obligatory, but where they do exist, they have 
been used as important interpretive sources about the parties’ 
expectations and actual behavior, including in the context of the 
current discussion.349 
Employers are likely to attempt broad and vague definitions of 
the job descriptions, so they can later claim that a certain task, or a 
certain work, were within the scope of employment. Hence, given 
the dynamic nature of the employment relationship, once again, the 
interpretive mode adopted by the courts is crucial.  An interpretive 
rule operating in favor of the employee will serve as an ex post 
incentive to the employers, to be more precise in the next case, ex 
ante.  Thus, the job description should be interpreted narrowly. 
However, informed consent is no magic cure to all problems, 
as authors might misunderstand and subsequently misjudge their 
options; understanding the options might be costly, as legal advice 
might be needed and other factors, such as cognitive biases, might 
divert their judgment.  The market and the law can respond with 
various background structures to minimize the biases.  One such 
example is group negotiations. 
2. Group Negotiations 
Singling out a specific employment relationship and observing 
inequality of power between the parties might miss the larger 
picture.  A possible way to figure out this complex field is framing 
the relationship in terms borrowed from game theory, as a repeat 
game or a one-shot game between the parties, followed by some 
 
 349 One court noted that “Courts deciding whether an employee’s project was the ‘kind 
of work’ the employee was hired to perform rely heavily on the employee’s job 
description.” City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.N.J. 1995).  Other cases 
have referred to job descriptions, though they do not seem to have followed the 
interpretive approach advocated here. See Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 569 
(4th Cir. 1994); Gilpin v. Sieber, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1297–98 (D. Or. 2006); Genzmer 
v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 
2002); Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing 
Marshall v. Miles Labs., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1986)). 
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distinctions.  Instead of focusing on one employment context with 
one employer and one employee, we should ask whether there is a 
larger market-picture.  If authors can act together, they might be 
able to overcome the weakness of each of them when they act on 
their own.  Common action of authors-employees can shift a one-
shot game into a more efficient repeat game.  The Hollywood 
screenwriters’ strike in late 2007 provides an example of a 
successful common action.350  The screenwriters could have 
chosen the legal avenue and relied on Tasini, but given Tasini’s 
aftermath, it seems that the screenwriters achieved more by 
striking. 
In a one-shot game, the parties are focused on the gains and 
losses from that specific interaction and each party attempts to 
maximize its gains.  If one party in a one-shot game is stronger 
than the other, absent a legal rule to the contrary, the stronger party 
is likely to take advantage of its power at the expense of the other 
party.  This is often the situation of independent contractors.  To 
prevent this, all legal models assist the weaker side in various 
ways.  The U.S. model, for example, leaves the copyright with the 
independent contractor, unless several conditions are met.351  
These conditions delineate when a relationship is a work-made-for- 
hire; only specific kinds of commissioned works qualify, and, most 
importantly in my view, the parties must formalize their 
relationship and explicitly specify that the work is to be considered 
a work-made-for-hire.352  These requirements, once fulfilled, 
contain a clear signal to the parties about the kind of transaction 
into which they are entering, including the issue of copyright 
ownership.  The required formalities inform both parties, and each 
side can now assess its situation and decide whether to enter the 
transaction or not. 
Unlike independent contractors, the employee and the 
employer are engaged in a repeat game.  In a content industry 
context, the employer is interested in the employee creating more 
 
 350 See Press Release, Writers’ Guild of America, Writers Guild Members 
Overwhelmingly Ratify New Contract (Feb. 26, 2008),  http://www.wga.org/subpage_ 
newsevents.aspx?id=2780. 
 351 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (2006). 
 352 Id. §§ 101, 201. 
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works of quality and the employee knows that.  The employer who 
is interested in a steady stream of works realizes that it will be 
counter-productive to treat the employee in an unfair manner, all 
other factors being equal.353  In the normal course of the 
employment relationship and under the assumptions of no other 
market failures, these considerations mean that the salary will be 
reasonable and/or that the employer will search for ways to create 
incentives for the employees where there are unexpected, 
unforeseen gains.354  Internal incentives can take the form of 
bonuses or a more direct sharing of the revenues, such as an 
escalating scheme: After covering the expenses, the more revenue 
the work produces, the higher will be the employee’s share.355 
The result of the dynamics described here can be achieved by 
forming a union.  Once the employees act together, they are no 
longer in a continuous one-shot game subject to the arbitrary will 
of the employer, but rather, they are part of a multiple repeat game 
between two parties whose respective power is now on par, or at 
least not as unequal as before unionizing. 
The assumptions underlying this analysis should be underlined, 
so we know the limits thereof and can address other situations 
accordingly.  The above applies to the content industry, where 
employees are hired to make creative works. A content industry, 
by definition, engages in the continuous production of creative 
works, hence the game is a repeat one.  Both parties are aware (or 
should be) of the trade-off of risks.  The consideration takes place 
ex ante, when the author still has the choice of working as an 
individual, independent contractor, or as an employee. The author 
therefore engages in the transaction at free will and has been 
informed, and thus the requirement of informed consent is satisfied 
 
 353 One factor that might disturb this scenario is the market power of the employer.  If 
the employer has a monopolistic power in the field and the employee’s skills are not 
easily applicable in other industries, then the employer is likely to be able to extract more 
from the employees. 
 354 Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 550. 
 355 The sharing of gains should not be at the expense of the steady salary, otherwise the 
risk component of the salary increases and the employer is likely to reduce the base 
salary. See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 145, at 272.  A 
salary based solely on a pay for performance principle runs into many difficulties. See 
Vandenberghe, supra note 329, at 550. 
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and asymmetries of information are narrowed. When these 
assumptions do not apply, such as in a non-content industry where 
an employee unexpectedly makes a work of authorship, the 
ownership was not discussed and was not traded-off, it would not 
make sense to talk about a repeat game. 
CONCLUSION 
This article searched for the most efficient and fair rule of 
initial allocation of copyright in works created by authors in the 
workplace.  Applying a dual perspective of both copyright law and 
employment law results in several lessons.  First, we should 
recognize typical cases, in which we can identify the risk-bearer (a 
lesson from copyright law).  Possible criteria for devising such 
typical cases are the kind of work, the kind of employee, and the 
business of the employer.  These criteria serve as proxies for the 
allocation of risks and fairness and are helpful under both the 
copyright and the employment law analysis, thus providing 
convenient common grounds to integrate the two bodies of law and 
diffuse the tension between efficiency and fairness.  Second, the 
law should allocate the rights to the best risk-bearer (a lesson from 
copyright law), while searching for potential instances of unequal 
bargaining power such as information deficiencies and addressing 
them (a lesson from employment law).  Third, the law should 
avoid allocations which the market is likely to instantly correct in a 
costless manner (a lesson from the Coasean analysis and Tasini’s 
aftermath).  Fourth, from an employment law perspective, this 
article suggested that we should search for mechanisms that correct 
information deficiencies. These led us to distinguish between 
different factual situations, which fit the typical cases proposed 
under the copyright law analysis.  Furthermore, this article 
suggested the enhanced use of written job descriptions, 
accompanied by pro-author interpretive rules.  Fifth, we realized 
that penalty default rules would not be an efficient tool to 
overcome information deficiencies in the employment context, due 
to the nature of the employment relationship and their subsequent 
demoralization costs. 
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Thus, this article largely supports the current legal model, with 
some proposed modifications regarding the interpretation of the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine.  However, it is based on a joint 
copyright-employment analysis, rather than an agency/tort shaky 
basis. 
The result of this analysis seems to be counterintuitive, or at 
least contrary to some intuitions.  At first sight, it might seem that 
creative employees (the “Bryants”) are less protected under the 
above analysis than those who happen to make a creative work by 
chance (The “Millers”).  However, the analysis showed that the 
trade-off risks and the informed consent satisfactorily responds to 
the unfairness instincts. 
 
